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Abstract  
Scientists exploring individuals, as such scientists are individuals themselves and thus not 
independent from their objects of research, encounter profound challenges; in particular, 
high risks for anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric biases and various fallacies in reasoning. 
The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-
Paradigm) aims to tackle these challenges by exploring and making explicit the philosophical 
presuppositions that are being made and the metatheories and methodologies that are used 
in the field. This article introduces basic fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm including the 
epistemological principle of complementarity and metatheoretical concepts for exploring 
individuals as living organisms. Centrally, the TPS-Paradigm considers three metatheoretical 
properties (spatial location in relation to individuals’ bodies, temporal extension, and 
physicality versus “non-physicality”) that can be conceived in different forms for various kinds 
of phenomena explored in individuals (morphology, physiology, behaviour, the psyche, 
semiotic representations, artificially modified outer appearances and contexts). These 
properties, as they determine the phenomena’s accessibility in everyday life and research, 
are used to elaborate philosophy-of-science foundations and to derive general 
methodological implications for the elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology 
matching and for scientific quantification of the various kinds of phenomena studied. On the 
basis of these foundations, the article explores the metatheories and methodologies that are 
used or needed to empirically study each given kind of phenomenon in individuals in 
general. Building on these general implications, the article derives special implications for 
exploring individuals’ “personality”, which the TPS-Paradigm conceives of as individual-
specificity in all of the various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals. 
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Why do individuals differ? This central question of everyday life has already been stimulating 
theoretical developments in philosophy and science for millennia (e.g., works of Hippocrates 
and Galen; Hirschberger 1980). The question seems simple, but it is not. It addresses an 
entire complex of very different issues.  
First, it enquires about differences between individuals. But which kinds of 
phenomena1 should be considered—what individuals look like, how they behave, how they 
feel, what they think, what motivates them or what they disclose about themselves? And 
differences of what kind are important—differences in what is typical for individuals or in how 
consistent they are across different contexts or differences within one individual from day to 
day or over longer periods of time? Or should we consider all of this together?  
Second, asking why individuals differ is also targeted at exploring the particular 
individual—not just as a random specimen of a given population of individuals, but in terms 
of his or her uniqueness and peculiarities that differentiate him or her from other individuals, 
precisely because individuals are often not all the same (cf. Allport 1937). Explorations of 
differences between individuals are prerequisites for identifying what is specific to a 
particular individual (Uher 2013). But this fact should not mislead researchers to assume that 
methodologies suited to explore individual differences are also suited to explore the 
functioning of the single individual. In fact, they are not (ex explored in this research).  
Third, the initial question seeks explanations. The particular kinds of explanations 
naturally depend on the particular kinds of phenomena considered, on whether variations 
between individuals or within individuals are studied, and whether individuals’ constellation 
of peculiarities at some time or their functioning and development over time are in the focus. 
Different kinds of phenomena, variations and research perspectives require different kinds of 
approaches, methods and explanatory concepts. Conversely, particular methodologies and 
particular kinds of explanations allow only particular kinds of phenomena, variations and 
research perspectives to be explored (as elaborated in this research).  
Hence, addressing the—only at first sight—simple question of why individuals differ 
involves an entire complex of heterogeneous research questions. Since Hippocrates and 
other ancient scholars first wrote down their theoretical ideas, a plethora of theoretical and 
methodological approaches and investigatory methods have been developed. Over the last 
century, the fields of research exploring individual differences and individual peculiarities—
nowadays mostly under the term “personality”2—have seen heated controversies between 
different schools of thought. These controversies have emerged along very different lines of 
dissent.  
Controversies 
A core controversy arose on the scientific dictum scientia non est individuorum—the 
idea that a scientific discipline cannot be devoted to studying single cases given that science 
seeks regularities and lawfulness through abstraction and generalisation from unique events. 
Many “personality” psychologists therefore pursue nomothetic approaches (from the Greek 
nomos, the law) exploring individuals only as examples of prototypical individuals and 
seeking to identify universal principles. Individuals’ characteristics are therefore dissected 
into narrow phenomena that are accessible to empirical investigation and that are studied 
using generalised concepts applicable to all individuals in the same way.  
But the dissected and generalised individual is “entirely mythical” (Allport 1937, p. 5). 
“In everyday life, the scientist, like anyone else, deals effectively with his fellow men only by 
recognizing that their peculiar natures are not adequately represented in his discovery” (p. 
4). Other psychologists therefore oppose nomothetic views and pursue ideographic 
approaches (from the Greek ideos, the peculiar) focussing their explorations on single 
individuals and seeking to understand the particular individual without destroying its integrity 
                                               
1
 For a definition of the term phenomenon as used here, see the section on the Central Absolute 
Presuppositions in About Research on Individuals in part II below. 
2
 The term “personality” is put in quotation marks in this trilogy to indicate that its definitions vary and 
that different researchers use this term to refer to different kinds of phenomena and kinds of variation. 
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(e.g., Lamiell 2003; Toomela & Valsiner 2010; Salvatore, Gennaro & Valsiner 2013). 
Ideographic concepts therefore converge more strongly with our everyday experiences, thus 
fulfilling James’ (1890) requirement that “conceived systems [of psychological theory] … 
must at least include the reality of the sensible objects in it” (p. 312). But for many 
psychologists, this places ideographic approaches close to common sense, which arouses 
suspicion about their scientificality. This suspicion reflects the tense, at times dismissive 
attitude held by scientific psychology towards everyday beliefs, despite the tight and 
important relationships between everyday psychology and scientific psychology (explored in 
detail in this research, see below; cf. also Uher 2013). 
Other controversies have been based on the question of what “personality”—the core 
concept of contemporary psychology to comprehensively study individuals’ peculiarities—
actually is. Some researchers conceive of “personality” from external perspectives by 
considering the impressions that individuals make upon others (e.g., in terms of their “social 
stimulus value”; Allport & Odbert 1936; Cattell 1950). Accordingly, “personality” includes 
social perception, description and judgement (Goldberg 1990; John, Angleitner & Ostendorf 
1988); it is conceived as socially attributed and socioculturally constructed (e.g., Kelly 1955). 
External perspectives are also considered in “personality” concepts that incorporate 
morphology (e.g., Guildford 1959), constitution (e.g., Eysenck 1947) or behaviour (e.g., 
Pervin & John 1997; Funder 2004)—often along with thoughts and emotions; thus, with 
phenomena that occur internal to the individual. Some other perspectives, in turn, approach 
individuals solely from the internal perspective as reflected by Allport’s (1937) widely used 
definition of “personality” as “the dynamic organization within the individual of those 
psychophysical systems that determine his unique adjustments to his environment” (p. 48). 
These “psychophysical views” (p. 40) conceive of “personality” as detached from (potentially 
erroneous) social perception and judgement—as how an individual “really is” (p. 48).  
Debates between proponents of internal perspectives on individuals unfold along the 
lines of research conceiving of “personality” as rather stable inner structures versus as 
dynamic processes (Fleeson 2001; Giordano 2014; Mischel & Shoda 1998; Sato, 
Wakabayashi, Nameda et al., 2010). Still other debates have been based on the particular 
structure of taxonomic “personality” models in terms of varying numbers and qualities of the 
particular constructs constituting them (e.g., Ashton & Lee 2005; Cloninger 1986; Costa & 
McCrae 1992; Goldberg 1990; Tellegen 1993). 
Further controversies have occurred over the concepts of human nature (the “images 
of man”; Fahrenberg 2004; Shotter 1975) underlying different paradigmatic orientations, 
such as between ideas of humans as driven by subconscious inner urges and conflicts (e.g., 
Freud 1915), passively responding to environmental conditions (e.g., Skinner 1971, Watson 
1913) or actively striving for cognisance (e.g., Kelly 1955), personal growth and fulfilment 
(e.g., Maslow 1943, Rogers 1959). Related controversies have revolved around causal 
explanations of why individuals differ: on whether individuals are influenced more by their 
internal properties or by their external contexts in a given moment (cf. the person-situation 
controversy; e.g., Hartshorne & May 1928; Mischel 1968) as well as across their lifetime (cf. 
the nature-nurture controversy; e.g., Galton 1874; Loehlin 1992).  
Some of these controversies are meanwhile considered to be “solved”, such as the 
person-situation controversy (Fleeson 2004; Funder 2006) and the nature-nurture 
controversy (Eysenck 1990; Loehlin 1992) by recognising that various viewpoints are 
important for explaining why individuals differ. Building on this insight, formerly competing 
theoretical approaches (e.g., biological, psychodynamic-motivational, behavioural-learning, 
social-cognitive and humanistic approaches) are increasingly integrated as interconnected 
levels into overarching “personality systems”. Such integrative models are aimed at 
providing “a much more coherent view of the whole functioning individual in the social world” 
(Mischel, Shoda & Ayduk 2007). Other controversies are still openly burning, such as those 
between proponents of different taxonomic models (e.g., de Raad & Barelds 2008; McCrae 
2011) and especially those between ideographic and nomothetic viewpoints, which are 
increasingly regaining momentum worldwide (Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; Lamiell 1998, 
2003; Salvatore et al. 2013; Toomela & Valsiner 2010). 
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The philosophy-of-science perspective 
But what has been “solved” and “integrated” and what is still controversial, 
respectively? What is actually at the bottom of all these controversies? Exploring these 
questions requires philosophy-of-science. In contemporary psychology, philosophy-of-
science perspectives are rarely considered, however. They are taught in the university 
curricula only cursorily or not at all anymore. Many of today’s psychologists therefore may 
not be familiar with the basics of philosophy-of-science although it is fundamental to every 
science and to psychology in very particular ways (Fahrenberg 2013; Kant 1798; Walach 
2013; Wundt 1913).  
Philosophy-of-science refers to the most general level of scientific knowledge—
knowledge about the making of science (Fahrenberg 2013; Toomela 2012; Walach 2013). It 
requires researchers to make explicit and critically reflect on the philosophical 
presuppositions that they have made about the nature and properties of the phenomena to 
be explored and about the fundamental notions by which knowledge about them can be 
gained (Aristotle 350 BCE; Collingwood 1940). For example, a philosophical presupposition 
that is widespread in contemporary research is the assumption that, in nature, there are 
basic structures that follow rational or logical laws and that can thus be described in logically 
consistent ways and be explored by means of rational or logical analyses. At first glance, this 
assumption appears to be self-evident, but actually it is not—ultimately, how could this 
assumption be justified (Walach 2013)?  
Philosophical presuppositions are necessary for any given scientific system to 
function; they are used to derive the metatheories and methodologies that are applied in the 
given system. These presuppositions can be rationally discussed, but they are not rationally 
justifiable within the scientific system for which they are formulated. Rather, every scientific 
system of statements (including mathematical systems) has to rely on basic rational 
structures from outside the given system that is built upon them (cf. incompleteness 
theorem; Gödel 1931); therefore, these presuppositions are also called absolute 
presuppositions (Collingwood 1940). It follows that no scientific theory can ultimately be 
proven or validated as it is always possible that the absolute presuppositions on which a 
given scientific system (e.g., a paradigm, theory) is built may turn out to be untenable. It is 
also possible that competing and contradicting scientific systems are constructed on the 
basis of alternative absolute presuppositions (Fahrenberg 2013; Walach 2013).  
Absolute presuppositions vary across scientific communities, socio-political systems 
and historical times, such as the different images of human nature. Rational decisions on the 
ultimate validity and correctness of these presuppositions about human nature cannot be 
made within the research traditions for which they are formulated and in which they direct 
and guide the development of theories and research practices. Thus, although each given 
research tradition in psychology comprises a coherent set of statements, theories and 
methods, the different traditions are contradictory and sometimes even irreconcilable with 
one another because they are based on different absolute presuppositions (Fahrenberg 
2013; Walach 2013). Therefore, it is essential to make explicit the philosophical 
presuppositions on which a given scientific system is built in order to analyse from a meta-
perspective the theories, approaches and methods that are applied within this system—that 
is, to critically reflect on the metatheories and methodologies used in a given field.  
Metatheories are basic assumptions that determine how researchers reduce real 
phenomena to scientific phenomena and hence, what they consider to be facts in their field 
and how the thus-defined facts can be theoretically analysed and interpreted. Metatheories 
also refer to the implicit and explicit beliefs, theoretical ideas and basic assumptions that 
researchers make about their objects of research and to the questions that they ask about 
these objects (Althusser & Balibar 1970; Køppe 2012; Toomela 2011; Wagoner 2009; 
Weber 1949).  
Methodology refers to the ways (i.e., approaches) in which researchers tackle the 
questions that they asked about their objects of research and to the techniques and research 
practices (i.e., methods) that they therefore use. Hence, metatheory and methodology are 
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closely interrelated and intertwined with one another and with the philosophical 
presuppositions from which they were derived (Sprung & Sprung 1984; Uher 2013).  
In a nutshell, the philosophy-of-science perspective is vital for explicating the 
philosophical and metatheoretical assumptions underlying different theories and models that 
are created in a field and to unravel the methodological core principles governing the 
processes of their creation. Knowledge about the making of science is important to better 
understand and to place in context previous lines of research and their interrelations and to 
show ways of developing novel lines of research that allow for the exploration of the 
questions that previous lines have left unanswered (Valsiner 2012; Wolpert 1992).  
This trilogy of articles 
This trilogy of articles employs the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm 
for Research on Individuals (briefly referred to as TPS-Paradigm) to explore the basic 
metatheories and methodologies that are applied in research on individuals using the 
example of taxonomic “personality" research.  
The present first article (Uher 2014a) begins (part I) by pinpointing profound 
challenges that more strongly affect scientists studying individuals than those of other 
disciplines. It then (part II) introduces some basic fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm 
focussing on important absolute presuppositions that are made about the different kinds of 
phenomena that are frequently explored in research on individuals and on “personality”. 
Philosophy-of-science foundations are elaborated and general methodological implications 
are derived for the elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology matching and for the 
scientific quantifications of the various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals. From 
these considerations, the article derives (part III) implications for the metatheories and 
methodologies that are used and/or needed to investigate these kinds of phenomena in 
individuals in general. Building on these general implications, the article elaborates (part IV) 
special implications for exploring individual-specificity in these various kinds of phenomena, 
which is conceived of as “personality” in the TPS-Paradigm.  
On the basis of the insights gained about the special implications for exploring 
individual-specificity, the second article (Uher 2014b) explores the metatheoretical 
assumptions underlying the three methodological steps that are employed by psychologists 
for developing comprehensive “personality” taxonomies by focussing on some currently 
popular models. Centrally, this article scrutinises the specific methodologies and methods 
that are used in the field regarding their abilities to capture the particular kinds of 
phenomena towards which they are targeted and thereby reveals frequent mismatches. It 
shows that some explorations that are theoretically well justified have been empirically 
implemented only insufficiently so far. It identifies additional methodologies that can be 
derived from the same and alternative theories and that are required to fully explore the 
targeted phenomena but have yet to be tackled. The analyses also reveal that the primary 
use of standardised questionnaires has significantly hampered the empirical investigation of 
individual-specificity in most kinds of phenomena explored in individuals, in particular in 
experiencing3 and behaviour. The article presents both established and novel methodologies 
that appropriately meet the properties of the particular phenomena under study. 
The third article (Uher 2014c) explores the theoretical interpretations of the thus-
obtained models, constructs and data regarding the phenomena that these represent and 
their utility to explain individual-specific peculiarities, functioning and development. The 
philosophy-of-science analyses reveal widespread erroneous assumptions, rooted in 
everyday thinking, about the abilities of previous methodologies—and thus of the 
“personality” taxonomies derived from their application—to appropriately represent 
individual-specificity in targeted phenomena. Independent of the well-known differences in 
the absolute presuppositions about human nature, which will not be further considered in this 
trilogy, the analyses show that some of the controversies in the field are still openly burning 
                                               
3
 For the term experiencing, see the section on the Phenomena of the Psyche in part III below. 
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because, given the methodologies applied, many research traditions actually do not study 
the particular kinds of phenomena to which they are targeted. Corroborating concerns that 
have been voiced repeatedly, the article shows that previous taxonomic “personality” models 
have largely failed to empirically capture individual-specific experiencing, behaviour, 
functioning and development, psychology’s core objects of research. Novel methodologies 
that may have the power to fill the identified gaps are presented together with potential ways 
in which methodologies and different kinds of taxonomies that have yet to be developed 
could be devised in future research. The article closes the trilogy by outlining three meta-
desiderata for future research on individuals and their “personality”. 
I) Psychologists’ challenges 
Scientific psychologists face profound challenges. How can a science explore and 
understand a subject matter from which the makers of this science are themselves 
inseparable (cf. Durkheim 1919)? How can scientists explore the functionings, abilities and 
limitations of the human mind when they are equipped with nothing but such a mind (cf. 
Stent 1969)? How can scientists explore the uniqueness of individuals’ thoughts, feelings 
and behaviours when each is a uniquely thinking, feeling and behaving individual him- or 
herself? How can there be “objectivity” in such a science? 
Anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric biases of type I and type II 
Any scientific endeavours are bound to the minds that make them (Valsiner 1998, 
2000, 2012). Therefore, science is inseparable from its makers’ particular perspectives on 
their objects of research given their own positions in the world—as humans, members of 
particular communities and individuals.  
Primarily, scientists are human beings with human-specific abilities, perspectives (cf. 
von Uexküll 1909) and interests that determine—and limit—their possibilities for exploring 
the world (cf. Nagel 1974). This entails risks for two types of systematic errors (Uher 2009). 
Anthropo-centric biases type I occur when scientists focus on only those phenomena that 
their species-specific abilities enable them to perceive or to conceive of, that are human-like 
(anthropo-morphic) or that scientists perceive as such in the sense of false positive biases.  
  
“There is a universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like 
themselves, and to transfer to every object, those qualities, with which they are 
familiarly acquainted, and of which they are intimately conscious. We find human 
faces in the moon, armies in the clouds; and by a natural propensity, if not corrected 
by experience and reflection, ascribe malice or good-will to every thing that hurts or 
pleases us” (Hume 1757; Section 3). 
 
Anthropo-centric biases type II, by contrast, occur when scientists ignore those 
phenomena that they cannot readily perceive or conceive of, that are not human-like or that 
scientists do not perceive as such in the sense of false negative biases (cf. Nagel 1974).  
These types of biases can affect scientists’ work on two levels (Uher 2009). On the 
metatheoretical level, these biases can influence the ways in which scientists demarcate 
scientific phenomena from real phenomena, what elements of these phenomena they 
consider to be facts, which objects of research they decide to study in these scientific 
phenomena, how they conceive of these objects and what questions they ask about these 
objects. On the methodological level, both types of biases can influence the techniques and 
practices that scientists use to convert and to encode perceived qualitative and quantitative 
properties of the selected elements into categorised data, and to analyse and interpret these 
data (see part II below and Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy).  
Scientific history is full of examples of both types of anthropo-centric biases. For 
example, beliefs about human uniqueness have long prevented researchers from even 
considering the idea that individual-specific behaviours could also be found in many other 
species as well (Uher 2011a), even in human’s closest relatives (Goodall 1986; Uher 2011b; 
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Yerkes 1939). Now, anthropo-centrism seems largely overcome on metatheoretical levels as 
shown by the significant increase of pertinent publications (cf. Freeman & Gosling 2010). But 
it still persists on methodological levels as evidenced by many animal researchers’ 
ignorance of the fact that “personality” ratings provided by human observers bias reports of 
nonhuman individual behaviours in often anthropomorphic ways (as demonstrated by Uher, 
Werner & Gosselt 2013a). Having an outsider’s perspective on other species need not make 
scientists any more “objective” in exploring them. Distance from the objects of research is a 
double-edged sword.  
Analogous types of ethno-centric biases occur on both levels when scientists 
(unintentionally) approach their objects of research based on their own position in their social 
world (Faucheux 1976; Teo & Febbraro 2003). Their particular gender (Pellegrini 2011), 
stage of ontogenetic development (Baldwin 1906), educational and sociocultural background 
(Adam & Hanna 2012; Geertz 1988), scientific discipline and school of thought (Kuhn 1976), 
nationality within the same scientific discipline (Russel 1927, pp. 29-30), political attitude 
(Cattell 1950, p.11), religion and worldview (Weber 1930, 1946), language (Deutscher 2010) 
and historical time (Fischer 1970; Gergen 1973)—to name just a few—make them insiders 
to particular communities and outsiders to others. “Insiders and outsiders exhibit different 
biases” (Lahlou 2011, p. 621).  
Ego-centric biases analogously occur, likewise in both types and on both levels, 
when the scientists’ own personal standpoints influence their scientific explorations (cf. 
Fahrenberg 2013; Weber 1949).  
 
“No matter how objective and simple it may appear, all description relies on personal 
interpretation—the author’s own point of view. It is well-known that man projects his 
personality onto everything, and that when he believes he is photographing the 
outside world he is often observing and depicting himself” (Ramón y Cajal 
1897/1999, p. 63). 
 
Hence, the diversity of scientific theories on the same object of research also reflects 
the diversity of personal views amongst their creators (Fahrenberg 2004, 2013; Geertz 
1988). Such biases are known in all sciences; inevitably, they are particularly pronounced in 
those sciences dealing with human individuals, such as psychiatry (Rosenhahn 1973), 
behavioural research (Devereux 1967), education (Rosenthal & Jacobson 1968)—and 
“personality” psychology (Uher 2013). 
But these biases are not just evils that are to be avoided. They are also important 
sources of inspiration for scientists (Teo & Febbraro 2003). New knowledge is created from 
experiences and knowledge made previously (Valsiner 2012). Anthropo-, ethno- and ego-
centric biases, because they are rooted in the researchers’ own experiences and knowledge 
from everyday life, are important sources of information and anchor points. Where else 
should students and scientists start from at the beginning of their scientific endeavours if not 
from what they already know as human, social and individual beings (Uher 2011a; Valsiner 
2000)? Scientists are never free of such biases (see Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy, 2013; 
Wolpert 1992).  
The scientists’ mind and its human peculiarities 
A plethora of further biases, illusions, errors and fallacies in reasoning is known to 
occur in human minds (e.g., Wolpert 1992). For researchers exploring why individuals differ, 
the law of least effort (Royce 1891) is particularly important. 
 
 “This law, that our consciousness constantly tends to the minimum of complexity and 
to the maximum of definiteness, is of great importance for all our knowledge. … If 
things have more than a certain complexity, not only will our limited powers of 
attention forbid us to unravel this complexity, but we shall strongly desire to believe 
the things actually much simpler than they are. … And thus, in every case where we 
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fancy ourselves sure of a simple law of Nature, we must remember that a good deal 
of the fancied simplicity may be due in the given case not to Nature, but to the 
ineradicable prejudice of our own minds in favor of regularity and simplicity” (Royce 
1891, pp. 316-317). 
 
Abstracting from complex phenomena entails further challenges. The semiotic tools 
of language allow human minds to convert—on a mere conceptual level—perceived 
properties (e.g., black) into hypothetical objects (e.g., blackness; called hypostatic 
abstraction; Peirce 1902, CP 4.227). This purely semiotic reification makes perceived 
qualities conceptually independent of their embodied perception (Neuman, Turney & Cohen, 
2012). This allows for the mental handling of abstract ideas and for their further abstraction 
(e.g., colour). Yet, in everyday life—and also in science—these linguistically created 
hypothetical objects are often treated erroneously as concrete objects. This so-called fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness (Whitehead 1929) may lead to wrong conclusions about the 
perceived objects; such like not recognising that colours, in and of themselves, are not 
properties inherent to objects or light itself, but are created only in individuals’ minds 
(Newton 1704).  
The fallacy of misplaced concreteness is particularly difficult to recognise for human 
psychologists as they explore the minds of individuals who are of their own kind. 
Psychologists therefore tend to mistake the concepts that they have developed in their own 
minds about the individuals being studied with those phenomena in the minds of the 
individuals being studied that they try to explore (for details, see Uher 2013; cf. James 
1890a, 1890b). For animal psychologists, recognising this difference is typically much easier 
but not self-evident either (Uher et al. 2013a). It is awareness and careful consideration of 
the possible involvement of biases in the processes of knowledge creation that should 
differentiate everyday psychologists from scientific psychologists. This also affects concepts 
of “objectivity”. 
The scientists’ beliefs and “objectivity” in research on individuals 
Scientists can never step outside of their being as human individuals. Crucially, 
because every scientist is an individual him- or herself, scientific knowledge systems about 
individuals, especially about human individuals, cannot be established on the basis of 
absolute presuppositions that are independent of the objects of research as is possible, for 
example, in physics, chemistry and most areas of biology. The absolute presuppositions that 
scientists make about their study phenomena and objects of research are inevitably 
influenced by their own (explicit and implicit) beliefs that they have developed from the 
inherently anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric experiences that they have had so far 
(Fahrenberg 2013; Uher 2011a; Walach 2013).  
It follows that, in research on individuals, the “objective” can be only intersubjective. 
The intersubjective need not—and actually cannot—be universal because consensus can be 
reached only if the absolute presuppositions are shared. Particular scientific communities 
therefore oppose others who make other absolute presuppositions and therefore follow other 
metatheories and methodologies and that, as a consequence thereof, reach other 
consensuses. Intersubjectivity is always bound to the individuals who establish it; 
intersubjectivity can therefore never be absolute (Weber 1949). For this reason, it is 
essential to make explicit the absolute presuppositions on which a given line of research is 
based because this enables critical reflection on both the absolute presuppositions that are 
made and the metatheories and methodologies that are developed according to the same or 
similar presuppositions (Uher 2013, Desiderata 1g, 1f). 
Keeping in mind such challenges of researchers who study individuals, the next part 
of this article (part II) introduces some central fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary 
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm that is applied in this trilogy to explore central controversies 
in research on individuals using the example of taxonomic “personality" research (Uher 
2014b, c). 
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II) The Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals 
(TPS-Paradigm): Relevant foundations 
The philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological foundations of the TPS-
Paradigm are based on various lines of thought from both philosophy and psychology. 
Space constraints in this trilogy limit the degree to which these historical precursors and 
other related lines of research can be referred to and to which meaningful links exist can be 
further explored and developed. Likewise, the article can introduce only those fundamentals 
that are directly relevant for the analyses presented in this trilogy with regard to taxonomic 
“personality” research. More comprehensive accounts of the TPS-Paradigm, its links to other 
lines of thought and more details and background information on the issues outlined here 
and on other related issues can be found in Uher (2014d, in prep.4).  
Nature and aim 
A paradigm is a philosophical and metatheoretical framework that is based on 
(explicit and/or implicit) absolute presuppositions and that comprises theories and models 
that are interrelated with one another and with the methodologies that are needed to 
empirically support the theoretical ideas conceived. As the TPS-Paradigm provides 
interlinked philosophical, metatheoretical and methodological frameworks, it is called a 
paradigm.  
Commonly, however, a paradigm is understood as a framework that is shared by the 
scientists of a given scientific community across some period of time. Scientific communities 
are thought collectives (Denkkollektive; Fleck 1935) that make decisions about which 
phenomena are considered to be facts and objects of research, what research questions are 
acceptable to ask and which practices used to demarcate, categorise, explore and explain 
these facts and objects of research are considered to be scientific and valid (Kuhn 1962; 
Walach 2013). In contrast to other research paradigms, the TPS-Paradigm systematically 
integrates and further develops metatheoretical and theoretical concepts and pertinent 
methodologies that were developed in various scientific disciplines—i.e., that originated from 
different established paradigms—and it complements and expands these concepts and 
methodologies by developing novel ones (Uher 2011a; 2013, 2014a, b, c). Therefore, it is 
called a transdisciplinary paradigm.  
The vital element of the TPS-Paradigm is the explicit formulation of the absolute 
presuppositions on which it is built and of the metatheories and methodologies that are 
developed on the basis of these absolute presuppositions. For this reason, the TPS-
Paradigm is referred to as a philosophy-of-science paradigm. All sciences are explicitly or 
implicitly based on a philosophy-of-science. In this regard, this labelling is not meant to 
indicate any unique feature that is not shared by any other paradigm. Rather, the name 
indicates that a great emphasis is placed on making explicit as comprehensively as possible 
the absolute presuppositions, metatheories and methodologies on which it and other lines of 
research are based. When made explicit, this enables the critical reflection, discussion and 
further development of previously established theories, models and research practices and 
the derivation of ideas for novel lines of research. This is seldom done in research on 
individuals (Fahrenberg 2013; Omi 2012; Schwarz 2014; Toomela 2011; Uher 2013; Walach 
2013; Weber 1949; Westen 1996).  
The following explicates the most basic absolute presuppositions on which the TPS-
Paradigm is based. Some researchers may agree with these presuppositions, others may 
not or only partially. Those who do not agree, must develop and use metatheories and 
methodologies other than the ones that are analysed in this trilogy (Uher 2014b, c), thus 
precluding direct comparisons. These explications are made both to reveal possible 
differences in the absolute presuppositions that are made in the field and, in particular, to 
enable comparisons and controversial discussions between different lines of research that 
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are based on the same or similar absolute presuppositions as made in the TPS-Paradigm 
(Uher 2013, Desiderata 1f, 1g).  
Central absolute presuppositions about research on individuals 
Science is made by human individuals. Therefore, all scientific endeavours are 
inextricably entwined with and thus limited by human’s perceptual and conceptual abilities. 
This statement does not imply denial of a reality that exists independently of human 
perception and conception and in which humans have evolved as a species over millions of 
years (Uher 2014d). It merely emphasises that the sole access that we can gain to this 
reality is enabled by these human abilities and that, consequently, these abilities limit our 
possibilities for getting to know about, explore and understand this reality. 
In the TPS-Paradigm, the term phenomenon therefore denotes anything that is 
perceptible (or can be made perceptible, e.g., through technical means) by the human 
senses and/or that can be conceived of by the human mind. This differs from various 
historical thought traditions in which phenomena are conceived of as mere sensory 
perceptions that are differentiated from non-sensual concepts (sometimes called noumena); 
for example, in the philosophies of Plato (Hirschberger 1980) or Kant (1781). 
The elementary system of three metatheoretical properties to differentiate 
various kinds of phenomena 
The TPS-Paradigm conceives of and differentiates various kinds of phenomena that 
are at the centre of research on individuals and that—all or just some of them—are often 
incorporated into definitions of “personality” (for details, see Uher 2013). Between them, the 
paradigm conceives of basic kinds and of composite kinds of phenomena.  
Basic kinds of phenomena are inseparable from the material entity of the individual 
being studied. The TPS-Paradigm differentiates from one another four basic kinds of 
phenomena; these are the phenomena of morphology, physiology, behaviour, and the 
psyche. Importantly, inseparability here refers to the material entity of the healthy and 
physically intact individual. Inner organs and blood can be separated from the individual’s 
body only by using invasive methods, thus infringing on his or her physical integrity; physical 
phenomena removed from the individual’s body no longer belong to his or her material 
entity. The phenomena of the psyche, in and of themselves, cannot be isolated from the 
individual’s body, no matter what invasive and advanced technical methods may be used; 
psychical5 phenomena can be separated from individual’s body only conceptually (e.g., on 
the basis of the metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for them as done in the 
TPS-Paradigm, see part III below).  
Composite kinds of phenomena, by contrast, each comprise several different kinds of 
phenomena, among them at least one basic kind of phenomenon that is thus inseparable (in 
the sense stated) from the individual under study. Therefore, composite kinds of phenomena 
are more heterogeneous and complex than each of the basic kinds of phenomena in and of 
itself. The TPS-Paradigm conceives of the phenomena of semiotic representations, 
artificially modified outer appearance and contexts (“environments”) as composite kinds of 
phenomena.  
These various kinds of phenomena, which will be defined and outlined below (part III; 
cf. Uher 2013, Desideratum 1a), are differentiated from one another on the basis of an 
elementary system of three metatheoretical properties that the TPS-Paradigm conceives for 
them. Each given kind of phenomenon can always be characterised by the particular form 
that it takes with regard to each of these properties—specifically, by a particular constellation 
of forms that can be conceived for them with regard to these three properties. Their specific 
and different constellations entail that each given kind of phenomenon has its own frame of 
reference that is applicable to the other kinds of phenomena only to some degree or not at 
all. The particular constellation in each given kind of phenomenon unequivocally determines 
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the methodologies required for empirical investigations; it also has important implications for 
pertinent metatheories. Insufficient differentiations especially between the basic kinds of 
phenomena may therefore entail mismatches with the methodologies that are applied for 
their investigation (explored in this part below and in Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy). 
Importantly, the absolute presuppositions made about the three metatheoretical 
properties and the distinctions between various kinds of phenomena are made in the TPS-
Paradigm only with regard to research on individuals; no claims for universal applicability or 
utility are made. Rather, other fields of research may hold other perspectives on these 
phenomena and may also focus on other kinds of phenomena and other metatheoretical 
properties that are not considered in this research.  
What metatheoretical properties are conceived? Given that all science is made by 
humans, the TPS-Paradigm concentrates on three properties that can be conceived for the 
phenomena explored in individuals and that determine whether and how these phenomena 
can be perceived by individuals in everyday life. Thus, these properties also determine the 
phenomena’s accessibility by researchers (or other individuals such as observers) and the 
ways in which researchers can make some phenomena that are not directly perceptible in 
everyday life accessible in research settings by using invasive and technical methods (see 
Uher 2014c in this trilogy).  
In line with this, the considerations of the TPS-Paradigm are always made in the 
spatial and temporal dimensions of everyday life experiences (i.e., spatial dimensions 
comparable to human bodies and the temporal dimensions of the international time 
standard) rather than in the dimensions that can be conceived at the molecular or atomic 
level or for outer space as explored, for example, in chemistry and quantum physics or 
astronomy. But in contrast to this and importantly, the three metatheoretical properties are 
conceived on levels of abstraction that are commonly not considered in either everyday life 
or science likely because these properties do not appear to be of primary concern for the 
often more specific research questions pursued in the field. However, as these abstract 
properties generally determine the phenomena’s accessibility for researchers, they also 
determine the accessibility of many further properties that can be perceived in the 
phenomena under study or can be inferred from them and that are mostly in the focus of 
research.  
1. Metatheoretical property: Physical location of the phenomena under study in 
relation to the material entity of the individual under study 
In the TPS-Paradigm, the concept of internality and/or externality differs in 
several important ways from previous concepts in research on individuals and on 
“personality”. First, with regard to this metatheoretical property, individuals, in and of 
themselves, are conceived of as material physical entities with particular spatial (and 
temporal) extensions rather than as subjectively, psychologically and/or socially 
constructed entities. Thus, the term individual refers to a concrete material entity that 
can be directly perceived in everyday life and that can be demarcated from its 
surroundings and from other individuals on the basis of the boundaries of its spatial 
extension. Second, the TPS-Paradigm considers externality and/or internality in 
terms of the spatial location of the particular phenomena under study (e.g., 
individuals’ morphology, behaviours) in relation to the material entity of the individual 
under study. Third, based upon the thus-defined physical location of the phenomena 
under study, the TPS-Paradigm considers their perceptibility by individuals primarily 
in everyday life conditions and only secondarily in experimental research conditions.  
The absolute presuppositions made about the spatial location of the 
phenomena under study reflect the everyday experience that individuals cannot 
directly perceive phenomena that are internal to other healthy and fully intact 
individuals’ bodies (e.g., inner organs, ligaments, bones, brain), because these 
phenomena are located “underneath the skin” (with a very few exceptions under 
particular conditions, e.g., teeth). In everyday life, individuals can directly perceive 
only phenomena that are external to others’ bodies (e.g., faces, clothes, books, 
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buildings). Physicians and scientists can make individuals’ internal phenomena 
perceptible (directly or indirectly) by using invasive and technical methods (e.g., 
surgery, x-ray). But this is possible only for internal phenomena that are physical (see 
below). Thus, in contrast to other lines of research, the TPS-Paradigm does not refer 
externality and/or internality to a particular theoretical focus that researchers may 
adopt in their explorations of individuals or to the perspectives that individuals can 
generally take with regard to themselves or others (cf. Kant 1781; Wundt 1896). 
Instead, this metatheoretical property is solely conceived of as the spatial location of 
the phenomena under study defined in relation to the (intact) material physical 
entities of the individuals under study because this location, together with the other 
two properties considered (see next) unequivocally determines the ways in which 
these phenomena can be perceived by individuals in everyday life conditions and 
accessed using research methods (explored below in parts III and IV, also in Uher 
2014d).  
2. Metatheoretical property: Temporal extension of the phenomena under study  
The TPS-Paradigm considers the temporal extension of the phenomena 
under study because researchers, observers and the individuals under study can 
directly perceive only those particular phenomena that are present in the moments of 
investigation. Some phenomena are temporally more extended (e.g., individuals’ 
morphology, buildings), which facilitates the perception of events. But other 
phenomena are momentary and fluctuating (e.g., behaviours, thoughts). Fluctuation 
and emphemerality entail particular challenges for the methodologies that are 
required for empirical investigations (explored in parts II and III below). 
3. Metatheoretical property: Physicality versus ”non-physicality”   
In the TPS-Paradigm, the conception of material physical properties denotes 
that, in the phenomena under study, spatial units that are rather constant and 
identically repeatable to a considerable extent can be conceived (e.g., molecules, 
cells, organs, body parts, texts, buildings). By contrast, immaterial physical 
phenomena do not feature spatial units, in and of themselves (e.g., heat, 
behaviours). But spatial units can be defined through the material physical 
phenomena of individuals’ bodies and of other external phenomena to which 
immaterial physical phenomena are systematically related. Importantly, the terms 
physicality and physical used in the TPS-Paradigm refer to the science of physics 
rather than to corporality, which cannot be conceived for immaterial physical 
phenomena. 
“Non-physicality”, by contrast, denotes the immaterial properties of the 
phenomena of the psyche that, in and of themselves, lack not only spatial units that 
are identically repeatable, at least to some degree—in fact, spatial dimensions can 
generally not be conceived for these phenomena (Kant 1798)—but that also lack 
systematic relations to the material and immaterial physical phenomena to which they 
are related (e.g., brain matter and physiology; Fahrenberg 2008a, 2013; Wundt 
1894). Importantly, in the TPS-Paradigm, the term “non-physicality” does not indicate 
a simple contrast to the physicality of other kinds of phenomena; for this reason, the 
term is put in quotation marks. The term is meant to denote properties that are often 
associated with the terms psychical6 or mental in the philosophical literature but less 
frequently in the psychological literature. Therefore, these terms are not used to refer 
to the metatheoretical properties that this paradigm denotes as “non-physical”. 
Moreover, in the TPS-Paradigm, psychical phenomena are considered not only with 
regard to their “non-physicality” but also with regard to the forms that they take with 
regard to the two other metatheoretical properties conceived, specifically their 
internality and temporal extension.  
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The differentiation of physical and “non-physical” properties made in the TPS-
Paradigm refers to one of the most fundamental problems of philosophical and psychological 
research: the psycho-physical, body-mind or brain-mind problem (e.g., Fahrenberg 1979, 
1992, 2013; Rothschuh 1963; Walach 2013), which is called the psyche-physicality problem 
in this paradigm, in accordance with its particular terminology. The pertinent assumptions 
underlying the TPS-Paradigm are based directly on the principle of complementarity.   
The epistemological principle of complementarity  
Bohr (1937) introduced the principle of complementarity as a solution for the wave-
particle dilemma in physical research on the nature of light and as a key term in quantum 
mechanics. Bohr highlighted the impossibility to sharply distinguish between the properties 
of a physical object under study and the inevitable interactions of these properties with other 
physical objects serving as measurement instruments. He stated that, by using different 
methods, apparently incompatible sorts of information can be obtained about the properties 
of the same physical object. These different properties cannot be brought into connection 
with each other by using deterministic concepts of causality. But for an exhaustive account 
of the findings obtained, all properties are equally essential and may therefore be regarded 
as complementary. In addition, as Heisenberg (1927) showed for physical phenomena, 
complementary properties of an object of research cannot be simultaneously determined 
with the same precision (i.e,. Unschärferelation, literally meaning “relation of imprecision”, 
but mostly translated as uncertainty principle).  
Bohr (1937) explicitly indicated that the principle of complementarity, which helped to 
clarify elementary research problems in physics, could prove to be an epistemological 
principle that is also helpful in the life sciences. Biology and psychology explore many 
phenomena exhibiting pairs of complementary properties that are mutually exclusive and 
maximally incompatible with one another but that are both related to the same object of 
research and both necessary for its sufficient description. Bohr explicitly suggested that the 
principle of complementarity also seems suited for viewing the old psyche-physicality 
problem in a new light in which it adopts a metaphysically neutral position, i.e., without 
presuppositions of monism or dualism. Rather, by analysing the presuppositions and the 
appropriateness of the conceptual structures involved, by conceiving frames of reference 
that are categorically different, self-contained, mutually complementing and both essential 
for exploring the particular phenomenon under study, the principle of complementarity is 
aimed at avoiding futile controversies and at rejecting methodological compromises while 
implying no limitations to the application of particular methods to describe and explore 
particular objects of research (Bohr 1937; Fahrenberg 2008a, 2013).  
In line with this Bohrian principle of complementarity and its various applications in 
philosophical and psychological research (e.g., Fahrenberg 1979, 1992, 2013; Hoche 2008; 
Walach 2013; Wundt 1894), the TPS-Paradigm emphasises the necessity of adequately 
considering—both theoretically and methodologically—the particular constellations of the 
forms that can be conceived for the different kinds of phenomena with regard to the three 
metatheoretical properties that it considers and that establish different frames of reference. 
Specifically, physical and “non-physical” properties each necessitate different ways of 
describing and exploring using different research approaches and methods that each rely on 
different criteria to establish the reliability and validity of the results that can be obtained with 
them.  
Similarly, the different forms that the phenomena can take with regard to the two 
other metatheoretical properties inherently require different methodologies. But in contrast to 
physicality versus ”non-physicality”, these forms are not mutually exclusive and therefore not 
complementary in the Bohrian sense. Rather, physical location relative to the individuals’ 
bodies and temporal extension can each be conceived of as gradual dimensions 
representing the same kind of property. Furthermore, the three metatheoretical properties in 
and of themselves are not complementary to each other. By contrast, each given kind of 
phenomenon is always characterised by a particular constellation of forms with regard to all 
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three properties; for example, behaviours are phenomena that are external, bound to the 
present moment and physical. 
Individuals as living organisms: Metatheoretical concepts of exploration   
Bohr (1937) furthermore pointed out that “those essential features of living organisms 
which are brought to light only under circumstances which exclude an exact account of their 
atomic constituents are laws of a nature which stands in a complementary relationship to 
those with which we are concerned in physics and chemistry” (p. 297). Hence, the 
epistemological principle of complementarity seems also useful for explorations on levels of 
abstraction as different as specific physical phenomena and complex living organisms.  
Living organisms can be conceived of as systems composed of sets of interrelated 
elements forming a complex organised whole (von Bertalanffy 1973). Living systems are 
complex at every level of their hierarchical structure of organisation; interrelated elements at 
one level are compounded into new elements at the next higher level (e.g., atoms, 
molecules, organelles, cells, organs, individuals). In living organisms, series of systems can 
be conceived that are organised within a greater array of even more complex systems 
(Caprara 1996). At each hierarchical level, complex organismal systems function as 
organised wholes and their properties cannot be deduced from knowledge of the constituting 
elements and their interrelations. When such systems are assembled from their elements, 
new characteristics of the whole emerge, and these could not have been predicted from 
knowledge of their constituents and the interrelations between them (e.g., Hartmann 1964; 
Mayr 1988; Rothschuh 1963; Wundt 1863).  
This so-called principle of emergence reveals that the identification of lower-level 
constituting elements of living organisms, in and of itself, does not explain how they function 
together as a whole; the whole has different properties, structures and functionings (e.g., 
Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; Köhler 1969; Koffka 1935; Pauli 1927; Toomela 2012; von 
Bertalanffy 1937; Vygotsky & Luria 1930). Therefore, assumptions of isomorphisms between 
interrelated elements at different levels (in all directions) can be very misleading (Mayr 1988; 
Wolpert 1992). The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that, when the different levels involve 
phenomena for which different metatheoretical properties and thus different frames of 
reference can be conceived, then isomorphisms can only be low, if not completely absent.  
Moreover, from the same set of interrelated elements, different properties and 
functionalities can emerge in different systemic contexts. As series of systems are nested 
within each other, the elements at any one level in the organism’s hierarchical organisation 
can be conceived of as multi-contextual (cf. Bronfenbrenner 1979; Morris 1988). Thus, 
multiple properties and functionalities may be identified for the same set of interrelated 
elements depending on which particular ones out of all their contextual phenomena are 
being considered (for definitions of context, situations, etc., see part III below). In addition, 
elements at any one level can be in continuous interaction with one another as well as with 
other elements both internal and external to the organism while being constantly integrated 
as wholes on different systemic levels (cf. Lewin 1936). 
Therefore, only some of the interrelations between elements within and across the 
entities considered can be conceived of as causal connections (Kausalzusammenhänge) of 
which various kinds can be conceived (e.g., simple and complex connections, successive 
and simultaneous causal chains). In addition, compositional connections 
(Gefügezusammenhänge) must be conceived in which the interacting elements co-occur in 
coordinated ways and match and cooperate with one another such that the entirety of their 
joint interactions results in complexes of higher organisation and unity (Rothschuh 1963). 
The presence or absence of single elements or single interrelations between them may 
fundamentally change the overall interactions of the same set of elements in the same set of 
contextual phenomena considered (Lewin 1936; Rothschuh 1963). For example, the various 
enzymes that are involved in the metabolic processes taking place in the mouth, stomach 
and intestines are matched with one another and with the pH-values that first enable their 
enzymatic activity. All these elements co-occur in a fine-tuned spatial and temporal proximity 
and a specific order in different parts of the digestive system. A lack or insufficiency of just 
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one single enzyme or a slight change in the pH-value of one specific systemic part (e.g., the 
stomach) can dramatically change the overall process and the outcomes (Rothschuh 1963).  
The principle of emergence and the occurrence of compositional connections 
between elements of any given entity entail that most empirical knowledge concerns 
processes (Rothschuh 1963). The development of living systems is often characterised by 
dialectical processes in which interactions between elements can result in lasting changes of 
the interacting elements in and of themselves as well as of their interrelations. These 
peculiarities entail that living organisms undergo in their microgenetic, ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic development continuous and irreversible processes that may also be 
historically unique and never repeatable (Baldwin 1896; Caprara 1996; Li 2003; Morris 1988; 
Prigogine 1996; Riegel 1979; Valsiner 2000).  
Given these developmental processes, living organisms can also be conceived of as 
self-organising systems that are therefore self-referential to a considerable extent 
(Fahrenberg 2013; Luisi 2003; Varela, Maturana & Uribe 1974). In addition, individual 
organisms can be conceived of as open systems that exchange with their surroundings (i.e., 
dissipative systems; Prigogine 1996; von Bertalanffy 1949). Dissipative systems (both non-
living and living) develop non-linear system dynamics. Even if their constituting elements are 
comprehensively known, in the course of development, bifurcations may occur, at which 
point the directions of a system’s future development become unpredictable. This may 
further contribute to the irreversibility of the processes occurring in the microgenetic, 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic development of living organisms (Prigogine 1996; cf. also Li 
2003; Lewis & Granic 2000; Vallacher & Nowak 1994).  
Living organisms are entities and unities with regard to both their self-identity in the 
flow of time and the results of the organised interactions between their compositional 
elements. In the course of the organism’s exchange of matter and energy with its external 
surroundings and the organisms’ ontogenetic changes, it remains the same organised 
system and can thus be conceived of as a spatio-temporal entity (raumzeitliche Ganzheit, 
Raumzeitgestalt; Rothschuh 1963). The living organism is an orderly arrangement of 
elements that interact with one another in complex ways. Therefore, this entity is more than 
the sum of its elements. Their interactions cannot be comprehensively explored in 
experimentally isolated elements because the elements, by interacting with one another, 
produce new, previously non-existing properties.  
Given that series of systems are nested within each other forming ever more complex 
entities, a complete knowledge of all conditions and all elements that determine the 
processes of a living organism is impossible. Generating knowledge about living organisms 
therefore requires observation and data collection from which information is abstracted and 
generalised to some extent in order to identify regularities and structures that are 
represented in (preliminary) structural models and theories. Abstract models are necessarily 
less detailed than every concrete unique event from which models are derived. But models 
and theories are structured, orderly and subordinated representations of the multiple and the 
manifold found in the immediately given events (Rothschuh 1963). Developing structural 
(taxonomic) models is thus an inherent task of every science—including a science 
concerned with individuals and their “personality” (as explored in detail in Uher 2014c in this 
trilogy). 
Considering the peculiarities of living organisms (e.g., systemic multi-layered 
organisation, principle of emergence, multi-contextuality, self-organisation, dialectical and 
irreversible processes of development, holism), the TPS-Paradigm highlights the necessity 
to distinguish explorations of compositional structures of the given entity considered from 
explorations of how the compositional elements identified may interact with one another, 
what new entities and functionings may emerge from their interactions and how the different 
systemic structures may develop over time—thus from explorations of process structures. 
Importantly, these different kinds of structures are mutually complementing in that 
explorations of processes presuppose that the elements interacting with one another are 
identified and knowledge of the processes, in turn, enables the identification of higher-order 
entities of interacting elements forming new wholes with new properties. Thus, both kinds of 
Uher, J. (2015a). Conceiving "personality": Psychologists’ challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary 
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 398-458.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12124-014-9283-1 
http://janauher.com 17/53
structural perspectives are necessary to comprehensively explore individuals and are 
therefore conceived as complementary to one another in the TPS-Paradigm (as elaborated 
in Uher 2014c in this trilogy).  
Research on individuals thus requires methodologies that allow for identifying and 
tracing elements and dynamic, multi-causal, multi-directional, multi-contextual, multi-linear 
and non-linear interrelations within and across different levels of hierarchical organisation 
(e.g., Bohr 1937; Caprara 1996; Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; Lewis & Granic 2000; Nagel 
1961; Prigogine 1996; Salvatore et al. 2010; Vallacher & Nowak 1994; Valsiner, Molenaar, 
Chaudhary & Lyra 2009; Wallaczek 2000). The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that researching 
the various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals inherently requires a plurality of 
methodological approaches that are complementary in the Bohrian sense in that they each 
reveal different kinds of information about living organisms that are altogether necessary to 
comprehensively explore individuals (for details, see also Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy; 
Fahrenberg 2013; Walach 2013; Wundt 1866, 1919).  
Importantly, however, complementarity does not mean to compromise between 
opposing perspectives and to combine elements of incompatible methodologies with one 
another. Instead, the TPS-Paradigm emphasises that particular methodologies allow for 
exploring only particular kinds of phenomena and only particular properties. On the basis of 
the particular philosophical presuppositions that it makes about research on individuals, the 
paradigm elaborates general methodological implications and basic principles for the 
elementary problem of how research methodologies can be matched to the particular 
phenomena under study (cf. Uher 2013, Desiderata 1a, 1d). 
General methodological implications: Basic issues of phenomenon-methodology 
matching  
Central to any science is the development of methodologies that enable researchers 
to explore the particular phenomena under study. This is referred to as the elementary 
problem of phenomenon-methodology matching in the TPS-Paradigm.  
Many controversies have arisen with regard to this matching problem. In 
psychological research on individuals, a prominent debate has existed on the suitability of 
quantitative versus qualitative methodologies. (Another related debate about between-
individual versus within-individual methodologies is explored in Uher 2014c in this trilogy.) 
Much of the quantitative-qualitative debate is centred on concepts of quantity and 
measurement, experimental manipulation for identifying the magnitude of relations between 
events (e.g., additive structures), operationalism, kinds of measurement scales and issues of 
validity, reliability and measurement error, amongst others (for a recent debate, see e.g., 
Michell 1997, 2003, 2011; Rosenbaum & Valsiner 2011; Saint-Mont 2012; Toomela 2008, 
2011; Trendler 2009). The basic issues in this debate are focused on the inferences that can 
be made about the phenomena under study given that the empirical structures that can be 
obtained from them do or do not match particular mathematical properties or statistical 
theories (Saint-Mont 2012). But only little attention is devoted to the ways in which the 
empirical data that are being analysed are actually generated in the first place 
(methodologies for data generation and data analysis used in “personality” research are 
explored in Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
Specifically, under which particular conditions can a particular methodology actually 
be considered to be “appropriate” and under which ones should it be considered a “serious 
problem” (as is often voiced in this debate)? What specifically does “appropriate” mean? 
What constitutes a “serious problem”? Hence, what specific properties must a methodology 
have, and what should it enable researchers to do? Pertinent debates are surprisingly vague 
about answering these fundamental questions. 
The TPS-Paradigm elaborates clear-cut criteria that researchers can use to decide 
whether and how a particular methodology can be matched to a particular phenomenon 
under study. On the basis of the philosophical presuppositions that it makes about research 
on individuals and the three metatheoretical properties that it conceives for the phenomena 
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explored in individuals and on the levels of abstraction that it considers, the TPS-Paradigm 
derives general methodological implications and elaborates philosophy-of-science 
foundations of scientific quantification. These implications and foundations are used to 
explore the elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology matching and to derive 
methodological principles that specify how this matching can be established by researchers 
(cf. Uher 2013, Desiderata 1a, 1d, 1f). Importantly, in this stage of the research process, the 
TPS-Paradigm considers neither mathematics nor statistics nor any properties of the 
phenomena under study other than the three metatheoretical ones referring to their temporal 
and spatial extension. 
A first set of methodological implications is derived from the elementary system 
comprised of the three metatheoretical properties. The TPS-Paradigm specifies that, 
because these particular properties determine the phenomena’s perceptibility by 
individuals—and thus their accessibility by researchers, the methods used for explorations 
must be matched to the particular forms that can be conceived for a given phenomenon 
under study with regard to each of these properties.  
Matching temporal properties: Nunc-ipsum methods   
A first category of methods is derived and defined on the basis of the temporal 
properties of the phenomena under study—i.e., their temporal extension. Phenomena of only 
brief temporal extension can be perceived by individuals and can thus be recorded by 
observers or researchers only in the moments in which their events occur (e.g., the height of 
a jump) or sometimes directly after their occurrence (e.g., the end of an individual’s walk). 
The brief temporal extension of phenomena under study requires methods that allow for the 
real-time recording of ephemeral events; the TPS-Paradigm defines such methods as nunc-
ipsum methods, derived from the Latin nunc ipsum meaning at this very instant. This 
category of methods comprises a heterogeneous set of methods that each target at a 
specific kind of phenomenon (e.g., behaviour, physiology) and that often involve various 
technical means that facilitate the recording of momentary events (e.g., video-based 
recording of behaviours, electric devices to record evoked neural potentials such as EEG).  
Importantly, in any given research setting, events of all of the various kinds of 
phenomena that can be explored in individuals may be present in the particular moments of 
investigation. Nunc-ipsum methods are defined with regard to only those particular kinds of 
phenomena at which they are targeted, regardless of the fact that other kinds of phenomena 
are likely present all that time as well. For example, physical phenomena (e.g., individuals’ 
ankles, Egyptian mummies) can be explored only if these physical phenomena are present 
in the moments of investigation (e.g., surgery, x-rays). Physical objects that are not present 
in investigations may nevertheless play a role, such as when individuals think about 
particular objects or even about their absence in a given research setting. But in this case, it 
is these individuals’ thoughts about these objects—i.e., psychical phenomena—that are 
present and that can thus be investigated, but not the physical objects that are being 
psychically represented in and of themselves. 
Matching Spatial Properties: Extroquestive and introquestive methods  
The TPS-Paradigm derives and defines two further categories of methods on the 
basis of the spatial properties of the phenomena under study—i.e., their spatial location in 
relation to the material entity of the studied individual’s body and their physicality versus 
“non-physicality”. 
Extroquestive methods (from the Latin extro meaning beyond, outside and exter 
meaning being on the outside) are defined in the TPS-Paradigm as all procedures for 
studying phenomena that individuals can directly perceive as being located external to their 
bodies and that can therefore be directly perceived by multiple individuals—thus, only 
physical phenomena. Using the same perceptual ways on which extroquestion is based, 
individuals can also directly perceive many physical phenomena of their own bodies both 
external (e.g., hands) and, under particular conditions, even internal (e.g., blood and tissue 
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in open wounds). Importantly, physical phenomena of individuals’ bodies can be directly 
perceived by other individuals as well—thus using extroquestion (as explored further below).  
Introquestive methods (from the Latin intro meaning in, within), by contrast, are 
defined as all procedures for studying phenomena that can be directly perceived only from 
within the individual him- or herself and that are, in principle, not directly perceptible by any 
other individual under all possible conditions—thus, only psychical phenomena. This entails 
intricate challenges as the researchers themselves cannot directly perceive the particular 
phenomena under study but have to rely on individuals’ externalisations, especially self-
reports, as explored in this trilogy. 
The TPS-Paradigm introduces these terms to denote the particular kinds of methods 
that are conceived on the basis of its elementary system comprised of the three 
metatheoretical properties and to differentiate these specific methods from various previous 
concepts and methods of introspection and extrospection (cf., Boring 1953; Butler 2013; 
James 1890b; Locke 1689). The ending (extro- and intro)–questive or –question (from the 
Latin quaerere meaning to seek, ask, enquire, and from quaestio meaning seeking, 
investigation, enquiry, question) implies that these methods involve all kinds of sensation 
and perception (e.g., haptic, acoustic, olfactoric) rather than only visual ones as is implied by 
the ending –spective or –spection (from the Latin spectare meaning to look at, see, watch). 
The ending –questive or –question also implies the involvement of some active exploration 
on the part of the individuals who perceive the phenomena under study7.  
All physical phenomena that are external to the studied individuals’ bodies can be 
explored using extroquestive methods. Individuals’ internal physical phenomena (e.g., 
bones, ligaments) can also be explored extroquestively if invasive methods are used (e.g., 
surgery). For this reason, technical methods that make internal physical phenomena 
perceptible by human individuals (e.g., arthroscopy) are also referred to as extroquestive 
methods although these methods enable only indirect perceptions of the actual phenomena 
under study (e.g., during arthroscopy, surgeons can directly perceive only videos of bones 
and ligaments but not the bones and ligaments in and of themselves). The essential point for 
defining extroquestion is that the same internal physical phenomena (e.g., ligaments) can 
also be made directly perceptible by others under particular conditions, such as by using 
invasive methods (e.g., open joint surgery). The extroquestive accessibility of phenomena is 
important because it enables multiple individuals to perceive one and the same event (e.g., 
the bones and ligaments found in a particular knee joint of a particular individual) and this 
helps an intersubjective consensus to be reached on how to demarcate and categorise 
events (cf. basic conversion principles and encoding schemes below). 
By contrast, neurosurgeons or neuroscientists cannot extroquestively perceive or 
make extroquestively accessible an individual’s experiencings (e.g., pains, thoughts)—no 
matter what invasive and advanced technical methods they may use. Psychical phenomena 
can be directly accessed only by the individual him- or herself—i.e., introquestively—and by 
nobody else (Kant 1786; Locke 1689; Pauli 1927). This is a central point considered in the 
TPS-Paradigm (Uher 2013, 2014d). The fundamental imperceptibility of psychical 
phenomena by other individuals entails that, in contrast to physical phenomena, one and the 
same psychical event (e.g., someone’s joint pains) can never be perceived by multiple 
individuals. This substantially complicates the ability to arrive at an intersubjective 
consensus on how to demarcate and categorise events (e.g., different kinds of 
experiencings conceived by individuals as different kinds of joint pains).  
Finding such a consensus is also complicated by the fact that introquestive outcomes 
can be scientifically explored only through their externalisation in physical phenomena (e.g., 
behaviours, phonemes and morphemes of language; see part III below) because the primary 
results of introquestion are psychical phenomena in and of themselves. Thus, introquestive 
results—like the experiential phenomena that are being introquestively explored—cannot be 
directly perceived by others. Therefore, any scientific exploration of individuals’ primary 
introquestive findings inevitably requires externalisation—this is called external 
                                               
7
 This is also true for the ending –spective or –spection, as spectare can also mean to consider. 
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physicalisation in the TPS-Paradigm. Even if philosophers and researchers introquestively 
explore only their own psychical phenomena, they have to publish their findings—i.e., make 
them public, thus accessible to others (e.g., in Augustine 397; Brentano 1874; Husserl 
1928). Otherwise it would not be research and would not be known. The TPS-Paradigm 
therefore conceives of introquestive methods not only as methods of trained and/or guided 
self-observation as is the case in many previous lines of introspection (e.g., Bühler 1907; 
Burkart, Kleining & Witt 2010; Butler 2013; Wundt 1888) but as a much broader spectrum 
comprising all methods that rely on both guided or non-guided self-observation and self-
report, including standardised methods such as self-report questionnaires. 
Excurse: Differences to operationalism  
Importantly, the idea that extroquestive methods can only be used to explore 
physical phenomena and that the introquestive exploration of psychical phenomena 
also inherently requires external physicalisations—and thus extroquestive methods 
as well—should not be mistaken for ideas of operationalism. Operationalism aims to 
specify operations by which a given scientific concept is measured; some (refuted) 
operationalistic ideas suggest that scientific concepts can even be universally defined 
by uniquely specified measurement operations (Bridgeman 1927; Chang 2009). By 
contrast, by considering the necessity that, in order to enable communication in both 
everyday life and science, individuals must externalise information from their 
psychical phenomena in external physical phenomena that other individuals can 
perceive, the TPS-Paradigm takes a much more abstract view on phenomena in 
general (Uher 2014d).  
In line with its aims, the TPS-Paradigm also specifies methodological 
principles and implications for the operationalisation of scientific concepts; but these 
implications refer to different issues (i.e., conversion principles, encoding schemes, 
see below). Specifically, from all words that individuals say (i.e., externally 
physicalise) and all behavioural acts that they exhibit in a given research setting, 
researchers select and define only particular words, phrases and behavioural acts as 
operationalisations (i.e., measurements) of particular scientific constructs in a given 
study. Hence, all phenomena defined as operationalisations of scientific constructs 
are physical phenomena. But vice versa, by far not all physical phenomena occurring 
in research settings are defined and used by scientists as operationalisations of 
particular scientific constructs. Moreover, researchers specify operationalisations for 
constructs of all kinds of phenomena (e.g., in physics) not only of psychical ones.  
Furthermore, with regard to psychical phenomena, the TPS-Paradigm 
explicates various intricacies that derive from the different metatheoretical properties 
that can be conceived for the physical externalising phenomena and for the psychical 
phenomena to which externalisations refer. It emphasises that, given these 
differences, isomorphisms between these different kinds of phenomena can only be 
low and that this hinders straightforward externalisations of psychical events and, 
vice versa, straightforward inferences from externalisations to an individual’s 
psychical events (cf. Moolenaar 2004; Toomela & Valsiner 2010; Uher 2013). Such 
considerations are not made in operationalistic approaches. By contrast, 
operationalisations are commonly (at least in interpretations) considered to be 
conceptually equivalent to the constructs that they are defined to measure, although 
constructs are abstract ideas and thus psychical phenomena, whereas 
operationalisations are always concrete physical phenomena. 
 
The concepts of extro- and introquestion differ from concepts of extro- and 
introspection in essential ways. Specifically, the TPS-Paradigm considers that individuals 
can perceive and conceive of physical phenomena (e.g., a cherry) and of their own psychical 
phenomena (e.g., emotions) and that they can do so at the same time. Individuals’ psychical 
phenomena may also directly refer to the particular physical phenomena that they 
extrospectively perceive in given moments (e.g., emotions about that cherry). In other words, 
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human individuals can extrospect and introspect simultaneously; both kinds of exploration 
are often inextricably interwoven (cf. contextuality of psychical phenomena; see part III 
below; Wundt 1896). Thus, for defining and differentiating research methods, if the focus lies 
on the individuals under study, introspection cannot be clearly differentiated from 
extrospection.  
The TPS-Paradigm explicitly considers that all individuals—research participants and 
researchers alike—can always perceive and conceive of both physical phenomena and 
psychical phenomena at the same time. In fact, the researchers’ own perceptions and 
conceptions of their study phenomena (e.g., their demarcations and categorisations of 
events) are the very means by which all science is made; thus, their extrospections and 
introspections are inseparably intertwined with their research (Kant 1781; Wundt 1896; 
Valsiner 1998, 2000, 2012). The TPS-Paradigm therefore bases the differentiation of 
introquestive versus extroquestive methods on its elementary system of the three 
metatheoretical properties that it considers. Accordingly, these methods are differentiated 
from one another and defined a) by the particular phenomena under study, explicitly 
considering that various other phenomena are likely present in the moments of investigation 
as well and that all individuals involved can introspect and extrospect at the same time, and 
b) by the particular persons who perceive the phenomena under study and who provide, for 
the purposes of scientific investigation, first representations of information from their 
perceptions and conceptions of the phenomena under study in particular external physical 
phenomena that are used as signs (e.g., written numbers, spoken words; see next section).  
For extroquestive explorations of physical phenomena, these persons are the 
researchers and their trained assistants and observers. But these persons can also be the 
individuals under study—provided they follow explicated encoding schemes (see next 
section; for an example of such a study, see Uher, Werner & Gosselt 2013a). For 
introquestive explorations, by contrast, the persons providing the first semiotic 
representations of information from the phenomena under study can only be the individuals 
whose psychical phenomena are being studied because psychical events are imperceptible 
by others in principle. Researchers, their assistants and any other persons can perceive and 
thus record only the studied individuals’ externalisations but not the actual phenomena under 
study (Kant 1786; Locke 1689).  
In sum, all scientific investigations of physical phenomena inherently rely on the 
researchers (and their assistants’) perceptions and conceptions of the phenomena under 
study (cf. Wundt 1896). Scientific investigations of psychical phenomena inherently rely on 
the studied individuals’ perceptions and conceptions of their own psychical phenomena and 
on these individuals’ pertinent external physicalisations. Because of this, encoding schemes 
must be explicitly defined by researchers for each given study to allow them to compare and 
reconsider the data and results thus-obtained within and across studies and to explore how 
the individuals under study may actually conceive of and externalise their psychical 
phenomena (see also Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy). These are fundamental issues 
underlying the elementary problem of phenomenon-methodology matching as well as the 
possibilities for obtaining scientific quantifications of the phenomena under study (cf. Uher 
2013, Desiderata 1d-g). 
Philosophy-of-science foundations of scientific quantification and the elementary 
problem of phenomenon-methodology matching 
Quantifications play a central role in science. To illuminate the fundamental 
methodological issues that quantifications entail for exploring individuals, in particular for 
psychical phenomena, the TPS-Paradigm elaborates philosophy-of-science foundations for 
scientific quantification. These foundations are based on its elementary system of the three 
metatheoretical properties that it considers and on established concepts of set theory and 
algebra (JCGM 2008). Accordingly, researchers must specify the sets of the elements to be 
quantified in the phenomena under study; this is referred to as the set-theoretic requirement 
of scientific quantification in the TPS-Paradigm. In addition, researchers must directly 
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compare the elements thus-defined with designated fixed standards to express their ratio as 
a real number; this is referred to as the algebraic requirement of scientific quantification. 
Semiotic Representation of Information from the Phenomena Under Study 
The TPS-Paradigm emphasises that the researchers’ opportunities for meeting these 
two elementary requirements are unequivocally determined by the metatheoretical 
properties that can be conceived for the phenomena under study. Importantly, in 
explorations of healthy and fully intact individuals, it is mostly not the phenomena under 
study in and of themselves (e.g., behaviours) that are being directly explored by researchers 
as is the case when researchers dissect body tissue or add chemical indicators to identify 
particular chemical substances. Rather, scientific explorations of individuals commonly rely 
on persons (e.g., researchers, observers, individuals studied) who represent information 
from their perceptions and conceptions of occurrences of the phenomena under study (e.g., 
demarcated and categorised events of behaviour) in external physical phenomena that can 
be used as signs (e.g., spoken words, lexically encoded variables, numerical data). It is 
these signs that are analysed in scientific explorations (e.g., using content analyses, 
statistical analyses) in lieu of the actual phenomena under study. 
The essential point is that the metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for 
the phenomena used as signs may be similar to or dissimilar from the metatheoretical 
properties that can be conceived for the actual phenomena under study. Crucially, the set-
theoretic and algebraic requirements for scientific quantification must be fulfilled with regard 
to the phenomena under study, not only with regard to the phenomena used only as signs. 
This is not well considered in many fields of research exploring individuals as demonstrated 
by the example of taxonomic “personality” research in this trilogy (see Uher 2014b, c). 
The TPS-Paradigm elaborates basic methodological principles and clear-cut criteria 
that researchers can use to decide whether or not particular methods allow them to meet the 
requirements of scientific quantification of their phenomena of interest. Such criteria have 
been missing so far, leading to the widespread practice of “quantifying” all kinds of 
phenomena by generating numerical data somehow or other but ignoring the fact that some 
metatheoretical properties substantially complicate or may not even enable quantifications. 
Therefore, to refer to numerical data that fulfil the set-theoretic and algebraic requirements 
with regard to the phenomena under study, the TPS-Paradigm uses the term scientific 
quantifications—as opposed to (subjective) quantifications denoting numerical data that do 
not fulfil requirements of scientific quantification (for details, see Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
Metatheoretical commensurability in conversions of information between 
different kinds of phenomena 
The term conversion generally denotes that information is carried over from a 
particular kind of phenomenon to another kind of phenomenon. Such conversions can occur 
between all kinds of phenomena that are directly interrelated. Importantly, human individuals 
convert information between different kinds of phenomena whenever they communicate with 
others and also in many other areas of everyday life (e.g., when using technologies). For 
example, when perceiving elements in their external surroundings, individuals convert 
information from external physical phenomena (e.g., of an entity comprised by biotic 
materials) into information in their psychical systems (e.g., perception and conception of that 
entity as an “apple”). To communicate this information to others, it must be externalised in 
physical phenomena (e.g., spoken words) that are perceptible by others who then convert 
this information into information in their own psychical systems and so on (Uher 2014d). 
Such conversions of information between different kinds of phenomena are also elementary 
for all methodologies used for generating data in all sciences. They play particularly 
important roles in research on individuals where data generation largely relies on 
conversions of information by human individuals (e.g., researchers, observers, the 
individuals being studied) rather than on technical conversions, as this is possible in the 
natural sciences to a considerable extent (see also Uher 2014c in this trilogy; cf. Wundt 
1896). 
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The TPS-Paradigm explores conversions of information on the basis of the three 
metatheoretical properties that it considers and of properties that are intersubjectively 
ascribed to the signs used in a given methodology (e.g., mathematical properties, lexical 
systems) and that are related to at least one of these three metatheoretical properties. For 
example, the rules for the divisibility of numbers are related to spatial units that can be 
conceived in the phenomena under study; numerals may be used to represent events that 
are conceived as distinct (e.g., nominal data) or to represent frequencies of events that are 
conceived as rather identically repeatable (e.g., metric data). Specifically, the particular 
constellation of forms with regard to all three metatheoretical properties that can be 
conceived for a given kind of phenomenon establishes its frame of reference. If the same 
constellation can be conceived for different kinds of phenomena, isomorphisms between 
their events can be high. Their frames of reference8 are then considered to be completely 
metatheoretically commensurable (derived from the Latin commensurabilis, which means 
having a common measure). Complete metatheoretical commensurability enables 
appropriate conversions of information between different kinds of phenomena. 
By contrast, conversions of information between kinds of phenomena for which 
different frames of reference can be conceived inevitably entail a loss of information (for this 
reason, this is referred to as conversion rather than as translation or transcription in the TPS-
Paradigm). As research is intrinsically targeted toward obtaining information that may not be 
known a priori about the phenomena under study, loss of relevant information need not 
become readily apparent in the physical phenomena that are used to represent the actual 
phenomena under study (i.e., signs). Significant loss of relevant information entails that the 
frame of reference of a given semiotic system cannot be applied to appropriately represent—
and thus to explore—the phenomena under study. This constitutes the elementary problem 
of matching the methodology to the phenomena under study (i.e., the phenomenon-
methodology matching; examples of such mismatches in taxonomic “personality” research 
are discussed in Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy).  
Complete metatheoretical commensurability can be illustrated by the example of 
scientific (medical) investigations of red blood cells. Red blood cells, when taken out of the 
individual’s body in a blood sample, can be extroquestively explored. The cells are 
temporally extended (they live for about 120 days) and they feature spatial units that are 
identically repeatable to a considerable degree (all cells are bounded by membranes). Given 
these (and further) properties, human observers (using microscopes) can demarcate red 
blood cells from one another and from other cells and substances in the blood (red blood 
cells look like oval biconcave discs), leaving hardly any room for intersubjective 
disagreement about what entity can be considered one (n = 1) red blood cell. This 
constellation of metatheoretical properties (i.e., extroquestively accessible, temporally 
extended, material physical) completely corresponds to the constellation that can be 
conceived for semiotic systems composed of lexically encoded variables and numerals 
taken down on paper or computer. In this example, isomorphisms between the phenomena 
under study and the phenomena used as signs can be high and their frames of reference 
can be considered completely metatheoretically commensurable, thus allowing for 
appropriate conversions of information between them.  
These constellations enable researchers and their assistants to reliably demarcate, 
systematically categorise and explicitly define the particular sets of elements to be studied 
and quantified. The elements thus-defined can be counted (e.g., red blood cell count, RBC) 
and directly compared with fixed physical standards of measurement (e.g., to determine the 
red blood cells’ mean corpuscular volume, MCV), thus fulfilling the set-theoretic and 
algebraic requirements for scientific quantification. These constellations of metatheoretical 
properties also enable automated technical conversions without involving any direct human 
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 The metatheoretical considerations that the TPS-Paradigm makes about frames of reference should 
not be confused with concepts of relational frame theory of human language and behaviour, which 
explores how human individuals develop higher cognitive abilities and acquire language on the basis 
of their abilities to relate events to one another (cf. Hayes, Barnes-Holmes & Roche 2001). 
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perception of the phenomena to be quantified in and of themselves (e.g., automated 
haematology analyser perform complete blood counts). 
Consent-based commensurability in conversions of information between 
different kinds of phenomena and basic conversion principles   
If metatheoretical commensurability can be assumed only partially or not at all, 
commensurability must be established on the basis of decisions. These decisions are made 
by the persons who directly perceive the phenomena under study and who provide the first 
conversions of information from these phenomena in information in other kinds of 
phenomena that can be used as signs. If these decisions are made explicit and specified in 
intersubjective agreement, this is called consent-based commensurability.  
For establishing consent-based commensurability, the TPS-Paradigm specifies basic 
conversion principles that are relevant for conversions of information between kinds of 
phenomena that differ from one another in their forms with regard to one or even all of the 
three metatheoretical properties considered. Conversion Principle 1 states that differences in 
the phenomena’s spatial location in relation to the individual’s body (i.e., internal versus 
external) may constrain conversions of information if, through these conversions, the 
phenomena under study are altered in and of themselves. Conversion Principle 2 denotes 
that constraints for conversions of information may arise if one or all of the phenomena that 
are involved have only brief temporal extensions (i.e., are momentary) and, in particular, if 
one or even both of the phenomena that are involved feature units that vary in temporal 
extension and that are therefore identically repeatable only to some extent. Conversion 
Principle 3 denotes that differences in the phenomena’s physical properties may constrain 
conversions of information between them if one or even both of the phenomena that are 
involved feature spatial units that vary in their spatial extension and that are thus identically 
repeatable only to some extent or if spatial units cannot be conceived at all.  
Conversion Principle 1 plays a role when, in explorations of individuals’ inner 
morphology (e.g., liver tissue) and physiology (e.g., metabolic processes in the liver), 
technical and invasive methods that infringe on the integrity of the individual’s body are 
used, thereby altering the phenomena under study. Moreover, this principle plays a 
fundamental role in explorations of psychical phenomena. Given their tight interconnections 
with the phenomena used for externalising information from them (cf. psyche–external 
surrounding connection in part III below) and given their functions for the individual, 
psychical phenomena may be altered through every externalisation, in particular, if semiotic 
representations are used (as explored in detail in part III below). Moreover, research settings 
in and of themselves may change individuals’ psychical phenomena as well as their 
externalisations. As Kant stated “The human being who notices that someone is observing 
him and trying to study him will either appear embarrassed, and then he cannot show how 
he really is, or he will disguise himself and then he does not want to be known as he is9” 
(1798/2000, p. 5). 
Conversion Principles 2 and 3 can be illustrated using the example of investigations 
of behaviours, such as the human gesture of waving hello to others. Waving is located 
external to individuals’ bodies and can thus be explored extroquestively. But human 
individuals can wave hello in very different ways; for example, they can move their hand in 
front of their bodies just a hand’s-breadth back and forth or they can move their arms in 
almost closed circles around their heads (not to mention the different directions in which 
hand and arms can be moved and that only one or both hands and/or arms can be used). 
Given this considerable variability in the spatial units that can be conceived for these 
behaviours, what entity can be demarcated and categorised as one (n = 1) hello wave? 
Which particular entities can be considered to be of the same kind, thus as identically 
repeatable at least to some extent? Moreover, even if comparable spatial units can be 
                                               
9
 Translated original: “Der Mensch, der es bemerkt, dass man ihn beobachtet und zu erforschen 
sucht, wird entweder verlegen (geniert) erscheinen, und da kann er sich nicht zeigen, wie er ist; oder 
er verstellt sich, und da will er nicht gekannt sein, wie er ist.“ (Kant 1798/2000, p. 5). 
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identified in particular waves, they can also differ in their temporal extension. Can a quick 
wave and a slow wave be conceived as entities of the same kind? For phenomena featuring 
spatial and temporal units that vary considerably and that are identically repeatable only to 
some extent, there is considerable scope for making decisions about how to convert 
information from the perceived events into particular physical events of semiotic systems (cf. 
Uher 2011b). Therefore, explicit encoding schemes are required. 
Meeting the set-theoretic requirement of scientific quantification: Establishing 
explicit encoding schemes   
To enable scientific quantifications, the conversion of information from the 
phenomena under study into the phenomena used as signs must be done systematically 
and according to explicitly defined assignment rules (e.g., coding schemes); this is referred 
to as encoding (also coding) in the TPS-Paradigm—as in many fields of research as well. It 
is only at this point that previous debates about the problem of phenomenon-methodology 
matching start their considerations. 
Encoding schemes specify the particular intersubjective agreements that are made in 
a given study about which particular pieces of information about the phenomena and events 
under study (e.g., spatial and temporal extensions of hello waves) as perceived and 
conceived by human individuals (e.g., researchers, observers) can be demarcated and 
categorised in what ways and how the thus-defined sets of elements can be represented 
through which particular signs (e.g., behavioural variables, numerals). The basic conversion 
principles elaborated in the TPS-Paradigm for each of the three metatheoretical properties 
specify the basic issues that must be addressed by researchers when establishing encoding 
schemes for any given study in order to specify explicitly defined sets of elements to be 
quantified for fulfilling the set-theoretic requirement of scientific quantification. These issues 
are well considered in many fields of behavioural research (e.g., explicitly defined 
ethogrammes and coding schemes). But they are often only insufficiently considered in 
many fields of psychological research, especially in research on “personality” (see below and 
Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy). 
Meeting the algebraic requirement of scientific quantifications: The concept of 
time-relative probabilities   
To meet the algebraic requirement of scientific quantifications, researchers must 
directly compare the demarcated, categorised and explicitly defined sets of elements of the 
phenomena under study with unchanging physical standard units of measurement to 
express their ratio as a real number (JCGM 2008). Again, crucially, these requirements must 
be fulfilled with regard to the phenomena under study, not only with regard to the physical 
phenomena that are used to represent information from the phenomena under study for the 
purposes of scientific investigation (e.g., lexically encoded variables, numerals). The TPS-
Paradigm highlights that the possibilities of meeting these requirements are unequivocally 
determined by the particular constellation of the forms that can be conceived for each given 
kind of phenomenon with regard to the three metatheoretical properties considered.  
Specifically, the physical standard units of measurement that are most widely used in 
science are based on measurements of space (e.g., distance or volume). In material 
physical phenomena, as they are temporally and spatially extended and feature spatial units 
that are identically repeatable to a considerable extent, the defined sets of the elements to 
be quantified can be compared directly with unchanging spatial standard units of 
measurement (e.g., micro-meter, feet, meter), thus fulfilling the algebraic requirement of 
scientific quantification. But direct comparisons with spatial standard units of measurement 
are complicated in phenomena that are bound to the immediate moment and that, moreover, 
feature units of varying spatial and/or temporal extension (e.g., behaviours; cf. the different 
ways of waving hello). In most observational contexts in research and everyday life, single 
behavioural events can seldom be directly compared with fixed spatial standards of 
measurement (e.g., of distance) in the moments in which the events occur (as is possible, 
e.g., by using a yard stick to measure the height of a jump but is much less possible for 
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measuring distances between individuals who are socially and physically interacting with one 
another in a game). 
To meet the algebraic requirement of scientific quantification for such kinds of 
phenomena, the TPS-Paradigm introduces the concept of time-relative probabilities in which 
not space but time is used as the physical standard unit of measurement to quantify the 
occurrences of defined events. Specifically, nunc-ipsum methods generate log files of the 
(non-)occurrences of defined events (e.g., particular behavioural events) from which 
quantitative measurements are obtained by accumulating the registered events over 
repeated occasions. As momentary phenomena fluctuate often, the measurements thus-
obtained can be only probabilistic. Time-relative probabilities are then obtained by relating 
the occurrences of defined events to the periods of time during which they were recorded 
and that are also precisely specified in terms of their sets of elements studied (i.e., basic 
time units, time samples, occasions; for details, see Uher 2013, pp. 6-11).  
As all sets of elements to be quantified are specified on the basis of explicit encoding 
schemes and as the elements thus-defined can be directly compared with the physical 
standard units of the time in which they were recorded, the concept of time-relative 
probabilities allows researchers to meet the set-theoretic and algebraic requirements of 
scientific and even ratio-scaled quantification of momentary and fluctuating phenomena 
featuring units that vary spatially and/or temporally. This concept, as it enables ratio-scaled 
quantifications, also allows for scientifically quantified comparisons not only of averages but 
also of variabilities and ranges in the occurrences of events across time (e.g., occasion-to-
occasion variability or longitudinal trajectories), across groups of individuals (e.g., age and 
gender differences), across studies, etc. It also enables scientifically quantified comparisons 
within and between individuals as required for comprehensive taxonomic explorations of 
“personality” (for details, see part IV below, Uher 2014b and in particular 2014c in this trilogy; 
Uher 2013). 
III) The various kinds of phenomena explored in research on individuals: Metatheories 
and methodologies required for their investigation  
The foundations outlined above (part II) are now used to explore in more detail the 
various kinds of phenomena that the TPS-Paradigm differentiates on the basis of its 
elementary system of the three metatheoretical properties. The following (part III) derives 
implications for the metatheories and methodologies that are required for investigations of 
these phenomena in individuals in general. Thereafter (part IV), the article derives specific 
implication for explorations of individual-specificity in each given kind of phenomenon, which 
is conceived of as “personality”. 
Phenomena of morphology and physiology 
In the TPS-Paradigm, morphology10 denotes living organisms’ bodily structures and 
their constituting parts. Morphological phenomena can be internal (e.g., bones) and external 
to the individual’s body (e.g., face), some can also be both (e.g., outer skin). These 
phenomena are temporally extended, but they can also change over time, in particular 
during ontogeny (e.g., physiognomy). Morphological phenomena are material physical 
phenomena; thus, they feature spatial units that allow for identical repeatability of events to a 
considerable extent (e.g., atoms, molecules, cells, organs, body parts). 
Physiology denotes the chemical and physical functioning of these structures. 
Physiological phenomena are primarily internal to the individual’s body (e.g., blood sugar), 
but some can also become external (e.g., sweat, electro-dermal activity). Many of these 
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 Morphology and physiology here denote the organismal structures and functions in and of 
themselves, not the scientific disciplines exploring them. In psychology, these organismal properties 
are often referred to as "biology" (e.g., as opposed to "culture"), but across disciplines, the term 
biology is conceived more broadly (e.g., comprising also ecology) and covers various kinds of 
phenomena that are differentiated in this paradigm.  
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kinds of phenomena are not strictly bound to the present moment (e.g., blood sugar levels), 
but some are strictly momentary (e.g., heart beat). Physiological phenomena are physical 
though not necessarily material in and of themselves (e.g., electric potentials); spatial units 
can be identified through the morphological phenomena in which they occur.  
These metatheoretical properties of morphological and physiological phenomena 
enable extroquestive explorations; multiple individuals can directly perceive one and the 
same event—by using invasive methods for exploring internal phenomena and technical 
means for exploring micro-level phenomena and momentary phenomena. This facilitates 
reaching intersubjective consensus on the demarcation, description and categorisation of 
events to establish explicitly defined sets of elements to be quantified. It also allows for direct 
comparisons of occurrences of events thus-defined with designated physical standards, thus 
enabling scientific quantifications and technology-assisted measurements (for details, see 
Uher 2014c in this trilogy; cf. Uher 2013). 
Phenomena of behaviour 
The TPS-Paradigm defines behaviours as the “external changes or activities of living 
organisms that are functionally mediated11 by other external phenomena (Millikan 1993) in 
the present moment” (Uher 2013; Uher et al. 2013a; Uher et al. 2013b). Importantly, not all 
external changes or activities are behaviours as they can also be mere by-products of an 
organism’s chemistry and physics (e.g., heat) or provide the function of regulating an 
organisms’ physiology (e.g., loss of heat serving thermo-regulation). Functional external 
changes or activities are behaviours only if their functions have reference to other external 
phenomena or to relations to them (Millikan 1993). For example, freezing in prey animals, a 
sudden cessation of any external activities or movements, is a behaviour because it is an 
external change that is functional in reference to other external phenomena (e.g., a predator, 
the abiotic external surroundings) in the present moment (e.g., by making the prey animal 
less salient to its predator, which may help to prevent an attack). 
This definition of behaviour differs in important ways from previous conceptions in 
psychology. Specifically, neither physiological responses nor mental activities are conceived 
of as behaviours; this differs fundamentally from concepts of behaviouristic paradigms (e.g., 
Skinner 1957). Rather, the TPS-Paradigm conceptually differentiates physiological, 
behavioural, psychical and other kinds of phenomena from one another on the basis of the 
three metatheoretical properties that it considers because insufficient consideration of these 
properties and of the particular frames of reference that they establish would entail serious 
mismatches with the methodologies applied (for details, see Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy). 
For the same reason, the TPS-Paradigm refrains from making a priori assumptions about 
the potential causation of behavioural phenomena in other kinds of phenomena (e.g., in the 
psychical system or in the external situation, see below) as is implied, for example, by the 
concepts of “goal-directed” actions or behavioural “responses” in some cognitivist 
paradigms. In addition to entailing methodological mismatches, such concepts overlook the 
fact that in individuals, as they are complex living systems, the events of a given 
phenomenon can be dynamically interrelated to and co-determined by events of all kinds of 
phenomena in various (subsidiary) systems that are both internal and external to the 
individual. Concepts implying potential causation in only one specific kind of phenomenon 
fail to meet this complexity. 
Hence, behavioural phenomena are located entirely external to the individual’s body. 
Importantly, behaviours are bound to the immediate moment; many behavioural events are 
of only brief temporal extension and highly fluctuating (cf. Morris 1988). Therefore, events 
can be perceived and thus be recorded only while they are still ongoing or immediately 
thereafter. Behaviours are physical phenomena but immaterial in and of themselves (e.g., 
movements). Behaviours are continuous and dynamic processes in which rather constant 
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 The meaning of the term mediation in the TPS-Paradigm refers to the Latin mediare, to be in the 
middle, not to the meaning established in statistics (where it is differentiated from moderation).   
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spatial units suggesting clear demarcations of single events are largely absent. But 
demarcations of events (e.g., walking) can be made on the basis of the material physical 
properties of the external surroundings (e.g., ground surface) and of the individual’s body to 
which behavioural phenomena are bound (e.g., legs). This also entails the identical 
repeatability of behavioural events to some extent (e.g., steps).  
The external physical properties of behaviours enable direct perceptions of one and 
the same event by multiple individuals, thus extroquestive methods. But joint perceptions of 
one and the same event are complicated by the behaviours’ limited temporal extension, 
which inherently requires nunc-ipsum methods. Further constraints arise from the lack of 
rather constant spatial units in behaviours in and of themselves. But given their external 
physicality, these constraints can be reduced by technically converting these phenomena 
into other kinds of physical phenomena (e.g., audiovisual records; see also Uher 2014c in 
this trilogy). This constellation of properties facilitates reaching intersubjective consensus on 
the demarcation, explicit description and categorisation of the particular phenomena and 
events to be studied, thus fulfilling the set-theoretic requirement of scientific quantification.  
Importantly, however, the momentariness of behaviours entails that single events can 
be directly quantified only if direct comparisons with unchanging physical standards of 
measurement (e.g., of distance) are possible either while the behavioural event to be 
quantified is occurring (e.g., using a bar to measure the height of a high jump) or directly 
after the event occurred such as using behavioural residuals (e.g., the foot prints that result 
from a long jump). But such opportunities are absent in most cases of behaviour observation 
in either research or everyday life. Likewise, the fluctuations of behaviours hinder direct 
comparisons between events of the same defined kind: within the same individual because 
previous events have already ceased to be and between individuals because individuals’ 
behaviours are seldom spatially and temporally exactly in parallel with one another to enable 
direct comparisons (as, e.g., in foot races; Uher 2013).  
Momentariness and fluctuations entail that every event of behaviour explicitly defined 
in terms of directly perceivable properties can be registered only in its occurrence (or non-
occurrence). In behaviour observations, nunc-ipsum methods therefore generate log files of 
behavioural occurrences, not quantifications. Only in a second step are the registered 
occurrences accumulated over repeated occasions and set in relation to the periods of time 
in which they were recorded using the concept of time-relative probabilities, thus fulfilling the 
algebraic requirement to generate ratio-scaled scientific quantifications (for details, see Uher 
2013; comprehensive empirical applications are demonstrated in Uher et al. 2013b).  
Behaviour-rating methods, by contrast, require observers to directly quantify degrees 
of intensity or frequency for the observed behavioural events without any opportunity for 
direct comparisons with unchanging physical standards of measurement. Even if ratings are 
made in real-time (e.g., ratings of videotaped behaviours), to quantify degrees, observers 
must compare the events they just observed with other events of the same kind but that, 
necessarily, have already ceased to be and of which observers have retained but memories. 
Hence, observers can compare their current perceptions only with reconstructed memories 
of past perceptions. But memories no longer reflect these past perceptions as originally 
experienced but represent them in inherently processed, abstracted and integrated forms 
(see next section). Such direct comparisons between perceived events of different kinds of 
phenomena inevitably entail methodological mismatches because these phenomena’s very 
different metatheoretical properties require different methodologies.  
As behaviours are functionally mediated by concurrent external events, the same 
external activity or externalisation can have different functions in different surroundings (cf. 
multi-contextuality). Moreover, as phenomena of life, these functionalities can also vary intra- 
and inter-individually. Investigations of behaviours therefore require contextualised methods 
specifying the particular constellation of external events in which the particular behaviours 
studied in a given individual occur in the moments of investigation (cf. behavioural situations 
below; for contextualised studies of individual behaviours, see Uher et al., 2008, 2013b; 
Wright & Zakriski 2003). This enables researchers to explore which particular kinds of 
external events may, in fact, functionally mediate the particular external changes or activities 
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of a given individual, thus making them behaviours. This, in turn, can be helpful for exploring 
potentially interrelated events and structures in the phenomena of individuals’ psyche. 
Phenomena of the psyche 
The psyche denotes the entirety of the phenomena of the immediate experiential 
reality both conscious and non-conscious of living organisms (cf. Wundt 1896). The TPS-
Paradigm relies on concepts of the psyche that are rooted primarily in German-language 
philosophy and psychology from the 19th and 20th century. It therefore refers to the events 
and phenomena of the psyche as psychical rather than psychological12 because “events, 
processes and structures that are properly called psychical do not become psychological 
until they have been operated upon in some way by the science of psychology” (Adams & 
Zener in Lewin 1935, p. vii). Importantly, the term psychical denotes not only mental 
phenomena because individuals’ immediate experiential reality always comprises emotional, 
volitional and other psychical phenomena as well (Wundt 1896). By conceiving of both 
conscious and non-conscious phenomena, the TPS-Paradigm also considers that not all 
psychical phenomena can be consciously perceived and easily verbalised but nevertheless 
form important parts of individuals’ immediate experiential reality (Freud 1915; Kant 1798; 
Kelly 1955).  
The TPS-Paradigm conceives of psychical phenomena as “non-physical”—that is, as 
immaterial and lacking any spatial dimension (Kant 1798), which also implies a lack of any 
spatial units that are identically repeatable, at least to some degree. Given this, the entirety 
of psychical phenomena cannot be conceived of as a material physical entity that could be 
directly perceived as is possible for individuals’ bodies; notions of “the psyche” in the TPS-
Paradigm therefore do not and cannot imply reification as a concrete entity. The entirety of 
psychical phenomena can only be conceived—thus as a subjectively and intersubjectively 
constructed entity. “Non-physicality” furthermore denotes that psychical phenomena are 
lacking systematic relations to the material and immaterial physical phenomena by which 
they are accompanied (e.g., nerve cells and electric potentials in the brain; Fahrenberg 
2008a, 2013; Wundt 1896). These “non-physical” properties of psychical phenomena entail 
particular challenges for research methodology, especially for attempts to apply quantitative 
methods (see below).  
The spatial location of psychical phenomena in relation to the individual’s body is 
entirely internal. But in contrast to internal physical phenomena (e.g. brain morphology and 
physiology), psychical phenomena are accessible only by the individual him- or herself and 
by nobody else (Kant 1786; Locke 1689; Pauli 1927). Psychical phenomena are therefore 
inherently subjective, individually unique and idiosyncratic (Weber 1949). One and the same 
event can never be perceived by multiple individuals (Kant 1786; Locke 1689). This 
precludes direct comparisons between individuals and substantially complicates reaching 
intersubjective consensus on the demarcation, conversion and encoding of events (see 
below; Levine 2003; Schrödinger 1958; Toomela 2008; Uher 2013, 2014b, c in this trilogy).  
The TPS-Paradigm refers to the psyche also as the individual’s psychical system, 
implying some properties that are common to all living systems, such as self-organisation 
and therefore also self-referentiality to a considerable extent. Each psychical event is 
dynamically interrelated to and co-determined by all concurrent events both internal and 
external to the individual as well as by past events within the same individual; psychical 
events are multi-contextually and historically embedded in the individual’s life (Lewin 1935; 
Pauli 1927). Therefore, explorations of psychical phenomena require contextualised 
methods. As phenomena of life, psychical phenomena also vary intra-individually and inter-
individually, and they are under continuous and irreversible processes of development (Sato 
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to the undifferentiated English term “psychological” as a translation of both of the German terms 
psychisch and psychologisch, a differentiation found in many other languages as well (e.g., French, 
Italian, Dutch, Russian). 
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et al. 2010; Valsiner 2000, 2012; Varela et al. 1974). Psychological concepts can therefore 
be only probabilistic (Brunswik 1952, 1955; Uher 2013).  
The one-sided psyche–external surrounding connection   
Psychical phenomena are located entirely within the individual’s body—just like the 
morphological and physiological phenomena with which they are complementarily connected 
in the Bohrian sense (e.g., neuronal systems, the central nervous system in particular). 
Through these internal physical phenomena (e.g., sensory organs), direct and highly flexible 
conversions are possible from information of phenomena in the individual’s external 
surroundings (e.g., an apple) into information of his or her psychical phenomena (e.g., 
sensation and perception). But in the other direction, this is not possible. Direct and flexible 
conversions of information from the individual’s psychical phenomena and the internal 
physical phenomena with which they are complementarily connected (e.g., brain matter and 
physiology) to phenomena in the individual’s external surroundings are not possible (or only 
to comparably limited degrees, e.g., through metabolites). This is called the one-sided 
psyche–external surrounding connection13 in the TPS-Paradigm.  
Bridging this gap requires externalisations, other kinds of phenomena that mediate 
information from the individual’s psychical phenomena to phenomena in the external 
surroundings. The individual’s primary externalising phenomena are behaviours, which are 
external phenomena but bound to the individual’s body. The morphological and physiological 
phenomena that are functionally necessary for behavioural phenomena to occur (e.g., 
muscle fibres and their enervation) are not specifically considered with regard to the psyche–
external surrounding connection because they are spatially located inside the individual’s 
body (as defined in the TPS-Paradigm) and thus, cannot in and of themselves directly 
connect to phenomena in the individual’s external surroundings.  
Psychical and behavioural phenomena essentially differ from one another with regard 
to their “non-physicality” versus physicality and their location being completely internal 
versus completely external to the individual’s body. But their momentariness, dynamics and 
flexibility may be somewhat comparable to one another, enabling timely externalisation of 
information from the individual’s psychical phenomena to their external surroundings. This 
nearness-in-time is particularly important for the individual’s adaptation to and his or her 
interaction with dynamic and flexibly changing external surroundings, especially in social 
interactions. In comparison, other external phenomena of individuals’ bodies are much less 
flexible; outer morphology is thereby more static than artificial outer-appearance 
modifications, which, however, ultimately result from behaviours (see below; Uher 2013).  
The one-sidedness of the psyche-external surrounding connection and the bridging 
function of behaviour become strikingly apparent in individuals suffering from locked-in 
syndrome. In this pathological condition, individuals can consciously perceive; that is, they 
can internally convert information from their external surroundings into information in their 
psychical systems. But because of a loss of voluntary motor control, they cannot behave 
(e.g., produce speech, limb or facial movements); that is, they cannot externalise information 
from their psychical systems to their external surroundings (Laureys, Pellas, van Eeckhout et 
al. 2005).  
Behavioural phenomena are so flexible and so neatly intertwined with psychical 
phenomena that individuals commonly hardly notice their vital function in bridging this gap. 
This may contribute to conceptions of psychical phenomena as “inner behaviours” (e.g., 
Koffka 1935; Skinner 1957; Sprung & Sprung 1984). But importantly, given the different 
metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for psychical and for behavioural 
phenomena (i.e., internal-“non-physical” versus external-physical), their frames of reference 
differ from one another, thus enabling only partial metatheoretical commensurability between 
them on the basis of their boundedness to the immediate moment. In addition, both kinds of 
phenomena are also connected with and thus influenced by various other kinds of 
phenomena both internal and external to the individual’s body. For these reasons, one-to-
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one externalisations of information from psychical phenomena are not possible. Vice versa, 
straightforward inferences from behavioural events (i.e., behaviours or behavioural signs, 
e.g., spoken language; see semiotic representations below) to psychical events and 
assumptions of isomorphisms between interrelated events of these different kinds of 
phenomena cannot be made (Uher 2013). This is a crucial point for research methodology 
as explored below.  
Temporal extension: Experiencings and memorised psychical resultants  
In line with German-language psychological terminology, the TPS-Paradigm 
differentiates experiencings (Erleben, Stern 1924) from the experiences (Erfahrungen) that 
one can have in terms of information gained from past experiencings. Experiences are the a 
posteriori of experiencings; they are memorised psychical resultants that individuals retain of 
past events of experiencing in processed forms (cf. Bartlett 1932). 
Experiencings are strictly bound to the immediate moment; they are highly ephemeral 
occurring only at the minuscule border between the what-is-no-longer and the what-is-not-
yet that we conceive of as the present (Augustine 357; Pauli 1927; Stern 1924; Uher 2013; 
Valsiner 1998; 2012). Events of experiencings leave “impressions” on the individual’s 
psychical system (von Uexküll 1909) where they are processed and memorised, thus 
becoming experiences that are abstracted, interconnected with other experiences and 
integrated into the psychical system, which thereby changes permanently and develops 
continuously (e.g., Le Poidevin 2011; Valsiner 2012). Psychical resultants, as they are 
memorised, are inherently more temporally extended and are therefore perceived by 
individuals as comparably stable, although psychical resultants—just as experiencings, but 
necessarily slower than them—are in continuous processes of development as well (for 
details, see Uher 2014c in this trilogy; cf. Giordano 2014; Sato et al. 2010).  
Given these microgenetic and ontogenetic pathways of development, two kinds of 
memorised psychical resultants can be differentiated on metatheoretical levels. The TPS-
Paradigm conceives of these different kinds as compositional structures and as process 
structures—in line with its absolute presuppositions about individuals as living organisms 
(e.g., principle of emergence, multi-contextuality, self-organisation, dialectical processes). 
Compositional structures of psychical phenomena are perceived by individuals as the 
contents of their experiential reality, such as psychical representations of specific past 
events, abstracted ideas, beliefs and knowledge. Process structures refer to basic patterns 
in the processing of these contents, such as individuals’ capacities for attention, abstraction, 
(re-)construction, memory span, volition and self-organisation.  
Importantly, compositional structures can be accessed and process structures can be 
applied only in the individual’s ongoing experiencings. Memorised psychical resultants can 
only be reconstructed, retrieved, activated and executed in an individual’s experiencings. But 
the revival of a memorised experiencing once had is not that same past experiencing 
anymore (Le Poidevin 2011; Walach 2013; Uher 2013). It is a new experiencing in which the 
processed memory of the past one, as retained and integrated into the hitherto reached 
compositional and process structure of the individual’s psychical system, is being 
reconstructed and reactivated (cf. Schacter & Addis 2007). But this reconstruction and 
reactivation is never merely identically repeated (Bartlett 1932) because all experiencings 
are always embedded in the context of all other concurrent events internal and external to 
the individual in the given moment. Reactivated memorised psychical resultants, as they 
become experiencings, can be processed, reconstructed, further developed and reintegrated 
before they are memorised anew; a well-known fact underlying many psychotherapeutic 
approaches (e.g., Kelly 1955).  
Individuals commonly do not notice clear differentiations between the contents and 
the processes of their psychical systems because processes are always executed on some 
contents and because individuals can become aware of their memorised psychical resultants 
only in their ongoing experiencings. Similarly, individuals commonly do not notice clear 
differentiations between their experiencings and their memorised psychical resultants as can 
be made on a metatheoretical level on the basis of their temporal extension to some degree 
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because both kinds of psychical phenomena are intimately connected and interdependent 
and because the transitions between them are fluid during memorisation and reconstruction 
(cf. Gibson 1967). But regardless of people’s awareness of this, these differences have 
important methodological implications because they determine which particular kinds of 
phenomena can be actually explored by a given methodology. 
Methodological implications from the temporal properties of psychical 
phenomena: Nunc-ipsum introquestion, retro-introquestion and long-term memory-
based introquestion in self-assessments   
A first set of methodological implications derives from the particular temporal 
extension of psychical phenomena. Explorations of psychical phenomena, as they are 
internal and directly accessible only by the individual him- or herself, imperatively require 
introquestive methods. The boundedness of experiencings to the present moment actually 
requires real-time explorations, thus methods of nunc-ipsum introquestion. But attention and 
externalisation inevitably change the course of experiencings—that is, “inner observation in 
itself alters and obstructs the state of the observed object14” (Kant 1786/1968, p. 471; cf. 
Conversion Principle 1). This introduces particular intricacies to the scientific exploration of 
psychical phenomena and hinders nunc-ipsum explorations of more complex experiencings, 
thus allowing for explorations of only brief experiencings (e.g., sensory perceptions; cf. 
Wundt 1904). 
In retro-introquestion, individuals are therefore given a task and asked, directly after 
its completion, to reconstruct the experiencings that occurred while executing it, thus, ex 
post facto and without disturbing them (e.g., Bühler 1907; Rosenbaum & Valsiner 2011). As 
experiencings are always contextualised, the particular retrieval situation should be 
representative and ecologically valid for those situations in which the experiencings have 
occurred for activating episodic memory and enabling accurate reconstructions. Suitable 
methods enabling such investigations are, for example, the methods of subjective evidence-
based ethnography (SEBE; Lahlou 2006, 2011; Lahlou et al. 2009) and microgenetic 
methods (e.g., Diriwächter & Valsiner 2008; Wagoner 2009). 
Necessarily, these methods inherently rely on the studied individuals’ abilities to 
memorise and reconstruct their own psychical events. As nobody else can perceive the 
psychical events that are to be explored, the accuracy of the memorisations and 
reconstructions of the individuals under study cannot be validated by methods that are 
independent of these individuals. But vice versa, the individuals whose psychical 
phenomena are being studied can validate the researchers’ demarcations, re-codings and 
interpretations of the studied individuals’ externalisations and the researchers’ inferences to 
and reconstructions of the psychical phenomena being studied. Therefore, the individuals 
under study should ideally be involved at least in some extent as is done in qualitative 
research (cf. techniques of member validation, communicative validation; Flick 2008). Their 
interpretations of results need not be accepted by researchers or be directly reflected in 
scientific theories. But the involvement of the individuals under study will help researchers to 
become aware of and to minimise potential anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric biases 
(unintentionally) introduced by the researchers themselves (Lahlou 2011; Uher 2014b). 
Importantly, the more time that has elapsed between experiencings and their 
introquestive revival and reconstruction, the more likely the memories of specific events will 
have faded as the psychical resultants developed from them will already be changed again 
through subsequent experiencings, abstractions, reconstructions and reintegrations into the 
psychical system. With an increasing time lag, individuals are therefore more likely to 
reconstruct particular past experiencings on the basis of abstracted and often 
decontextualised memorised psychical resultants (e.g., schemata, attitudes) that they have 
developed from and about patterns in the occurrences of the experiencings that they had in 
the past. As Kant expressed it “the places and circumstances of the time, if they are 
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enduring, bring about habits that… are of a different nature and that complicate a human 
being’s judgement of himself; how he should conceive of himself, and even more, how he 
should conceive of the other with whom he is in touch15” (Kant 1798/2000, p. 5). In addition, 
some of these memorised psychical resultants may also be influenced by normative semiotic 
representations (see below). Therefore, with an increasing time lag, individuals will more 
likely reconstruct experiencings that they believe they often have or ought to have in certain 
situations rather than the particular ones that they actually had in a particular moment. As 
retrieval is susceptible to various fallacies of memory (Schacter 1999), temporal proximity 
enabling short-term memory retrieval is essential for retro-introquestive methods. 
Self-report methods (e.g., standardised questionnaires) in which individuals are 
asked to report habitual experiencings (e.g., feelings), by contrast, rely on long-term 
memory-based introquestion. They require individuals to reconstruct psychical 
representations that they have developed from abstractions and generalisations made from 
wide arrays of past experiencings over time. Thus, although self-reports are reconstructed in 
the individual’s experiencings in the moments of enquiry, their contents reflect outcomes of 
past processions of experiencings in terms of, for example, self-knowledge, self-concepts or 
personal narratives (cf. McAdams 2006) but not those past experiencings in and of 
themselves. This is well considered in many explorations of psychical processes (e.g., 
individuals’ capacities for attention, their abilities for abstraction and for mental operation). 
Achievement and intelligence tests, for example, rather than asking individuals to report on 
their “habitual abilities” of mental processing, rely on nunc-ipsum methods in which 
outcomes of psychical processes (e.g., mathematical operations) are registered immediately 
after their generation and in the same situation and context in which they occur.  
Methodological implications from the spatial properties of psychical 
phenomena: Indirect explorations based on individuals’ externalisations   
A second set of methodological implications derives from the internal and “non-
physical” properties of psychical phenomena. Because of these properties, psychical 
phenomena cannot be perceived by other individuals in principle, and one and the same 
psychical event cannot be perceived by multiple individuals. The “non-physical” properties 
also preclude technical conversions of information from psychical phenomena into physical 
phenomena that other individuals could perceive—as this is possible for the immaterial 
physical phenomena in the brain with which psychical phenomena are connected in 
complementary ways (e.g., electric waves in the brain using electroencephalographs, EEG). 
This impossibility considerably complicates intersubjective comparisons of demarcations and 
encodings of one and the same event as perceived and made by the introquesting 
individual. But even for the introquesting individual him- or herself, the “non-physical“ and 
thus non-spatial properties of psychical phenomena do not offer any point of reference that 
he or she could use to reliably demarcate and categorise defined units in the continuous flow 
of events that could be identically repeatable at least to some extent. Rather, the events of 
“the manifold of inner observation can be separated only by mere thought, but cannot be 
kept isolated from one another and combined again arbitrarily16” (Kant 1786/1968, p. 471). 
Given these properties, the set-theoretic requirement of scientific quantification cannot be 
fulfilled for psychical phenomena in and of themselves. 
However, the specific formations that phenomena of the psychical system take on in 
any given individual are not essential. Their essential core is the functionality—the 
meaning—that they have for the individual in the overall context of its life (Dilthey 1894) and 
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the specific context of the particular moment (for the definition of context, see below). Given 
that individuals and their psychical systems, as living systems, are self-referential to a 
considerable extent, the demarcation and categorisation of these meanings is solely a 
matter of subjective construction that can never be directly compared between individuals 
and that researchers cannot easily reconstruct because they have to rely on individuals’ 
externalisations (e.g., spoken words) for which different metatheoretical properties must be 
conceived, thus precluding straightforward inferences (see below).   
The “non-spatial” properties of psychical phenomena also impede comparisons with 
fixed spatial units of measurement (e.g., metric units). Specifically, direct “quantifications” of 
psychical events, such as degrees of frequency or intensity, as typically enquired about by 
standardised “personality” questionnaires, are not possible because experiencings are 
bound to the immediate moment. Thus, beyond comparisons between events co-occurring in 
the same or in consecutive moments (e.g., sensory perceptions, cf. Wundt 1904), individuals 
can compare their ongoing experiencings only with reconstructions and retrievals of past 
experiencings, which, however, are not stored in their original forms as once perceived but 
only in processed and abstracted forms. Thus, when trying to directly “quantify” particular 
kinds of experiencings, the particular past events from which abstracted memories are 
retained are unknown. In set-theoretic terms, this means that individuals are asked to 
quantify interrelations between elements, although the elements themselves are unknown, 
which violates basic requirements for scientific quantification (Uher 2013). Therefore, 
quantitative methods of data generation and data analysis are not suited to explore psychical 
phenomena in and of themselves (for details also see Uher 2014b, c in this trilogy; also e.g., 
Levine 2003; Loftus 1996; Schrödinger 1958; Toomela 2008, 2011; Weber 1949).  
This fact is frequently overlooked, most likely because quantitative methods are 
applicable to the externalising physical phenomena (e.g., behaviours, spoken words) 
through which psychical phenomena are inferred and indirectly studied. The concept of time-
relative probabilities allows researchers to fulfil the requirements of scientific quantification in 
investigations of individuals’ externalisations of psychical phenomena. Specifically, many 
phenomena that individuals use for externalisations are momentary (e.g., behaviours, 
spoken language). Given their dynamic and tight interrelations with psychical phenomena, 
externalising phenomena are also often fluctuating. Hence, any measurements that could be 
obtained for externalisations of psychical phenomena can be only probabilistic. To meet the 
set-theoretic requirement of scientific quantification, researchers must specify the sets of 
elements of the physical phenomena that the studied individuals use for externalising their 
psychical phenomena (e.g., behaviours, spoken words of everyday language). Moreover, 
researchers must specify the sets of elements of the physical phenomena that they, as 
researchers, use to intersubjectively encode their reconstructions of the studied individuals’ 
psychical phenomena (e.g., written words of scientific language; cf. Uher 2013, Desideratum 
1g), which may overlap with the externalisations used by the individuals under study. To 
meet the algebraic requirement of scientific quantification, the occurrences of events thus-
defined and as registered in log files using nunc-ipsum and retro-introquestive methods 
(e.g., using transcripts of interviews) are set in relation to the physical time during which they 
occurred, thus using time as the designated physical standard of measurement. Through 
accumulation over repeated occasions and specified periods of time, the obtained data are 
converted into ratio-scaled quantitative data. These data, as they represent scientific 
quantifications, can be explored using quantitative analyses, such as textual data analyses 
(examples are discussed in detail in Uher 2014b in this trilogy; cf. Lahlou 1996, 1998; 
Neuman 2014; Reinert 1983, 1990) 
But importantly, these quantitative data represent the physical phenomena that are 
used to externalise and to intersubjectively encode the psychical phenomena under study. 
These quantitative results cannot be used to draw direct inferences to psychical phenomena 
for straightforward interpretations (cf. Moolenaar 2004; Toomela & Valsiner 2010; Uher 
2013, Desideratum 7; Uher et al. 2013a, 2013b). Specifically, researchers have to rely on 
the studied individuals’ externalisations without knowing about how people—each one 
individually at each given moment—convert information from their internal psychical events 
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into external physical events that others can perceive (e.g., spoken words). This requires 
careful consideration of the peculiarities of these externalising phenomena, in particular, of 
the different metatheoretical properties that can be conceived for them and of the implicit 
structures that they may contain in and of themselves (e.g., implicit structures of meaning 
contained in language; see below). Hence, the frames of reference of the psychical 
phenomena under study and of the phenomena used for externalising information from them 
cannot be completely metatheoretically commensurable. Therefore, to infer psychical 
phenomena and to explore how individuals construct meanings and how they externalise 
information from their psychical systems, introquestive methods and hermeneutic-
interpretive approaches are required (e.g., in qualitative or ethnographic methods; 
Fahrenberg 2002; Gadamer 1975; Gillespie & Cornish 2014; Wundt 1921). 
In sum, for psychical phenomena, unique metatheoretical properties can be 
conceived that entail methodological intricacies. Specifically, as psychical phenomena are 
imperceptible by other individuals, researchers must rely on the studied individuals’ 
externalisations in other kinds of phenomena (Uher 2014d). As a consequence, explorations 
of psychical phenomena inherently require purposeful combinations of a plurality of 
complementary methodologies. Extroquestive methods and scientific quantifications are 
required to explore the studied individuals’ externalisations. Introquestive and hermeneutic-
interpretive methods are required to reconstruct from these externalisations the actual 
psychical phenomena under study as well as their possible relations to the externalisations 
made (cf. Fahrenberg 2008b, c; Wong 2009; Wundt 1894, 1920, 1921). From this it also 
follows that studying psychical phenomena imperatively requires also studying individuals’ 
behaviours and their semiotic representations (e.g., language; cf. Bühler 1934; Valsiner 
1998; Vygotsky 1934). 
Phenomena of semiotic representations  
To enable social exchange about psychical phenomena, as these are entirely internal 
and “non-physical” and therefore imperceptible by others, individuals must externalise the 
meanings that particular psychical phenomena (e.g., experiencings, retrieved memorised 
experiences, knowledge) have for them. In the TPS-Paradigm, externalisation means that 
individuals must physically represent information from their psychical phenomena (e.g., 
meanings) in information in behaviour or in matter. Therefore, this conversion of information 
is also referred to as external physicalisation in this paradigm (for details, see Uher 2014d; 
cf. objectivation, Moscovici 1961). 
For transmitting meanings of vital importance, species-specific behavioural 
repertoires have evolved. In addition, meanings can also be externalised in physical 
phenomena bound to individuals’ bodies (e.g., movements, vocalisations) that, unlike 
species-specific behaviours, have no (evolutionarily derived) fixed a priori function in a 
species and that thus need not be behaviours. To such external bodily phenomena, 
meanings can be assigned arbitrarily (cf. Holloway 1969), which makes these external 
changes or activities functional—and thus, (semiotic) behaviours. When such assignments 
are psychically represented by multiple individuals in socially shared ways (i.e., are co-
constructed), then the particular behaviours become behavioural signs (e.g., gestures, 
spoken language). Meanings can also be assigned to material phenomena that are 
independent of individuals’ bodies (i.e., stones, pottery) and that thereby become material 
signs (e.g., hieroglyphs, sculptures, insignia). Signs are created to externally and physically 
represent (i.e., to semiotically represent) meanings for facilitating and (for more abstract 
meanings) for first enabling their social co-construction. Human communities have 
developed comprehensive semiotic systems involving both behavioural signs and material 
signs that help individuals to overcome the fundamental imperceptibility of psychical 
phenomena by others, thus promoting social exchange and coordination (for details, see 
Uher 2014d; cf. Kant 1786). 
As psychical phenomena, meanings are always bound to individuals. Therefore and 
although meanings are also externally physicalised in signs (e.g., gestures, writings), 
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semiotic representations as well are always bound to the individuals who create and co-
construct them. The TPS-Paradigm therefore conceives of semiotic representations as 
composite kinds of phenomena comprising psychical phenomena (e.g., experiencings, 
memorised psychical resultants) that are tightly intertwined with particular physical 
phenomena that are located external to individuals’ bodies (e.g., behaviours, external 
materials like paper, stones, pottery). Crucially, the external physical phenomena (i.e., signs) 
comprised by semiotic representations cannot be understood without the particular psychical 
phenomena (e.g., meanings) with which signs are tightly intertwined. This is because 
meanings are not inherent to the physical phenomena that are used as signs by particular 
communities. Rather, it is the assignment of meanings that first turns external physical 
phenomena into signs. Thus, although many material signs (e.g., writings) can be physically 
separated from individuals’ bodies, the composite phenomena of semiotic representations 
(e.g., “culture”), in and of themselves, cannot be explored if the psychical phenomena are 
excluded from the considerations. Exclusive conceptual separations, as made in dualistic 
conceptions, such as when aiming to explore influences of language or “culture” on 
individuals’ “personality”, are not possible—unless the external physical phenomena are 
considered only as such (e.g., paper, stones, pottery) rather than as signs. Dualistic 
conceptions therefore entail circularity in exploration (for examples in taxonomic “personality” 
research, see Uher 2014c in this trilogy). 
Instead, the different kinds of phenomena that are comprised by semiotic 
representations can be conceptually separated from one another—and thus from the 
individuals studied—only inclusively (cf. Valsiner 1987). Inclusive conceptual separations 
can be made on the basis of the forms that the phenomena involved take with regard to the 
three metatheoretical properties considered in the TPS-Paradigm. Thus, semiotic 
representations are phenomena with heterogeneous metatheoretical properties that always 
comprise both “non-physical” and physical events, both internal and external events and 
they may also comprise both momentary (e.g., experiencings, behavioural signs) and non-
momentary events (e.g., material signs). The internal structures of the phenomena of 
semiotic representations are therefore more complex than those of any of the basic kinds of 
phenomena as conceived in the TPS-Paradigm.  
Inclusive conceptual separations enable important insights into the functions that 
semiotic representations fulfil in people’s lives for overcoming the fundamental 
imperceptibility of psychical phenomena by other individuals but also into the intricacies that 
are thereby entailed (Uher 2014d). Specifically, semiotic representations comprise different 
kinds of phenomena for which different metatheoretical properties can be conceived, thus 
precluding complete metatheoretical commensurability between their frames of reference. 
This entails that isomorphisms between their events can be only low; thus, one-to-one 
externalisations of psychical events in signs and, vice versa, one-to-one inferences from 
individuals’ semiotic externalisations to their psychical events are not possible.  
This impossibility is also due to implicit structures that are inherent to the semiotic 
representations of a given community—to both the external physical phenomena used as 
signs (e.g., phonetics) and their assignments to particular psychical phenomena (e.g., 
semantics). These structures may derive from and implicitly reflect socially shared 
abstractions, reconstructions and generalisations of the experiencings of individuals from 
past generations that first created the semiotic systems (cf. Gergen 1973; Valsiner 2012). 
The implicit structures that are contained in semiotic representations inevitably influence 
individuals’ psychical processes, and thus, also the compositional and process structures of 
their memorised psychical resultants. For example, linguistic abstraction enables abstract 
thinking and the development of abstract psychical representations (Lahlou 1996; Neuman, 
Turney & Cohen 2012; Peirce 1902, CP 4.227; Uher 2013; Whorf 1958; for details and 
examples from taxonomic “personality” research, see Uher 2014c in this trilogy).  
For these reasons, the lexical signs that individuals use for externalisations cannot 
denote the psychical events in the same ways in which individuals perceive them in a given 
moment (Vygotsky 1934). Many experiencings are generally not easily verbalised—i.e., fit 
into a pre-existing and socially shared system of semiotic externalisations (Brower 1949; 
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Kelly 1955; Komatsu 2012; Valsiner 2012). Moreover, as meanings are bound to individuals’ 
memories and always reconstructed anew in individuals’ experiencings, meanings 
continuously change and develop in single individuals and especially in communities of 
individuals. But these changes need not be reflected in the physical events used for their 
externalisation (e.g., words, monuments) that are (often purposefully chosen to be) more 
persistent and that also serve to slow down the inevitable change in meanings (for details, 
see Uher 2014d).  
These peculiarities have important methodological implications. As meanings vary 
within and between individuals and over time and as meanings are not inherent to the signs 
by which they are externally represented (e.g., phonemes, graphemes), the meanings that 
researchers construct for particular signs (e.g., statements in questionnaire items) therefore 
need not be the same as those fields of meanings that the studied individuals construct for 
them as this has already been demonstrated for some widely used standardised 
“personality” questionnaires (e.g., Arro 2013; Diriwächter, Valsiner & Sauck 2004; 
Rosenbaum & Valsiner 2011). Ignoring these important issues may introduce serious 
(anthropo-,) ethno- and ego-centric biases into the generation and analysis of data (see 
Uher 2014b in this trilogy) and the interpretation of results (see Uher 2014c in this trilogy), in 
particular in research on “personality” (see part IV below). This is a further point that argues 
for the idea that the individuals under study should ideally be involved at least to some 
extent without implying that their interpretations need to be accepted by researchers or be 
directly reflected in scientific theories as is already done in qualitative and ethnographic 
research (Flick 2008; Lahlou 2011). 
To conclude, the composite nature of semiotic representations as conceived in the 
TPS-Paradigm entails the peculiarity that their exploration is enabled not by a single kind of 
methodology alone (i.e., either extroquestive methods and scientific quantifications or 
introquestive and hermeneutic-interpretive methods). Instead, the methodologies must be 
selectively chosen for each of the different kinds of phenomena that are studied in the 
different steps of investigation and they must be combined with one another in 
complementary ways (see also Uher 2014c in this trilogy).  
Phenomena of artificially modified outer appearance 
A further composite kind of phenomenon conceived in the TPS-Paradigm comprises 
the phenomena of artificially modified outer appearance. These phenomena denote the parts 
of individuals’ natural outer morphology that individuals can change and physically modify in 
addition to and independent of changes that occur naturally during ontogeny (e.g., hairstyle, 
tattoos) and to which they can also attach physical objects (e.g., clothing, accessories). 
These phenomena are material physical and located external to individuals’ bodies. These 
artificial modifications are often targeted towards others’ perceptions and used to convey 
particular meanings to other individuals; thus they may play important roles in social 
perception and communication. Individuals can modify their outer appearances far more 
quickly than natural changes can occur in their outer morphology. But in contrast to the 
fluctuating phenomena of behaviours, artificially modified outer appearances are much more 
temporally extended, which facilitates their perception by others, thus promoting their 
semiotic function. Importantly, these phenomena can be modified by the individual him- or 
herself; this is particularly relevant for the social construction of individuals’ “personality”—
both by themselves and by others (see part IV below). For these reasons, the TPS-Paradigm 
conceives of these phenomena as special kinds of semiotic representations that are 
characterised by their physical attachment to individuals’ bodies, and it explores them 
accordingly. 
Phenomena of contexts 
External surroundings, settings or backgrounds are commonly conceived of as 
“environments” and conceptually separated from the individuals studied, such as when 
aiming to explore whether individuals’ behaviours are influenced more by their “personality” 
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or a given situation (cf. the person-situation controversy) or whether individuals’ “personality” 
is influenced more by innate properties or their developmental environments (cf. the nature-
nurture controversy). This dualistic conception is likely based on the researchers’ inherently 
extroquestive access to the individuals studied. It may also be based on the (implicit) 
recognitions that individuals’ psychical phenomena are fundamentally imperceptible by 
others and therefore cannot be directly studied and that individuals’ behavioural and semiotic 
externalisations are always influenced by both internal and external events. Given this, it is 
assumed that if external events are standardised or controlled, then all variations in 
individuals’ externalisations must be due to internal influences, thus enabling investigations 
of individuals’ psychical systems (Shweder & Sullivan 1990). But metatheoretically, such 
dualistic conceptions of contexts are not tenable (Morris 1988; Valsiner 1987).  
The TPS-Paradigm considers the fact that internal influences involve not only 
psychical phenomena but also morphological and physiological, thus physical phenomena. It 
also considers that the same constellation of external physical events is not the same for all 
individuals (Lewin 1936; Rotter 1954; Shweder & Sullivan 1990). Rather, individuals interact 
only with those particular properties of their external physical surroundings that they can 
sensually perceive and that are relevant for them given their particular physical and 
psychical organismal properties (Locke 1689; Nagel 1974; von Uexküll 1909). In fact, 
individuals are so intimately interconnected with external physical events that contextual 
phenomena cannot be conceived when the individuals under study are excluded from the 
considerations; thus, exclusive conceptual separations are not possible and dualistic 
concepts inevitably entail circularity in exploration (as explored in Uher 2014c in this trilogy).  
Given this and the philosophical presuppositions made about individuals as living 
organisms (cf. multi-contextuality), the TPS-Paradigm rejects dualistic conceptions and 
conceives of the phenomena of contexts as composite kinds of phenomena comprising 
several different kinds of phenomena. Among them—and often in the focus of contextual 
explorations—is at least one basic kind of phenomenon (i.e., morphological, physiological, 
behavioural or psychical), which is thus physically inseparable from the studied individual’s 
body. The further kinds of phenomena comprised by a given contextual phenomenon may 
be other basic kinds of phenomena and/or external phenomena that are independent from 
the material entity of individuals’ bodies (e.g., buildings, books, other individuals, plants, 
rocks). This composite conception implies that the different kinds of phenomena that are 
comprised by contextual phenomena can be conceptually separated from one another—and 
thus from the individual under study—only inclusively (cf. Valsiner 1987) on the basis of the 
forms that they take with regard to the three metatheoretical properties considered in the 
TPS-Paradigm. This composite conception also entails that heterogeneous metatheoretical 
properties can be conceived for the phenomena of contexts, such that they may comprise 
both external and internal phenomena, both physical and “non-physical” phenomena, and 
both momentary and non-momentary phenomena. Isomorphisms between interrelated 
events of different kinds of phenomena comprised by contextual phenomena are necessarily 
low, which entails that the structures of contextual phenomena are more complex than any 
of the basic kinds of phenomena as conceived in the TPS-Paradigm. 
Concepts of situations: Behavioural situations and psychically relevant 
situations 
The TPS-Paradigm conceives of a situation as the particular constellation of events 
that are physically present in a given moment and/or directly perceived by the individual 
under study. Specifically, an individual’s situation always comprises internal physical events, 
because his or her body is always present, such as morphological and physiological 
phenomena determinating, for example, the individual’s bodily or health constitution. From 
the universe of the psychical events of the individual under study, a situation comprises 
those elements that are ongoing in the present moment, thus all elements of the individual’s 
present experiencings (including psychical resultants retrieved and reconstructed from 
memory). From the universe of all external physical events, a situation comprises those 
Uher, J. (2015a). Conceiving "personality": Psychologists’ challenges and basic fundamentals of the Transdisciplinary 
Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 49, 398-458.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12124-014-9283-1 
http://janauher.com 39/53
events that are present in a given moment so that they are directly perceptible (consciously 
or not) by the individual under study. 
Behavioural situations17 are conceived of in the TPS-Paradigm as a special kind of 
situation that denotes the particular constellation of those external physical events that 
functionally mediate18 the individual’s external changes or activities in a given moment—that 
is, his or her behaviour. The events constituting behavioural situations, in and of themselves, 
are external and largely independent from to the individual’s body, but the criterion for 
demarcating these particular events from the universe of all the external physical events that 
are present in a given moment is bound to the properties of that individual; hence they are 
conceptually separated from the individual under study only inclusively. This criterion is 
defined as the effectiveness with which independent physical events make functional the 
individual’s external changes or activities that thereby become behaviours. Importantly, this 
demarcation is based on individuals’ external bodily events (i.e., behaviours), rather than on 
internal events (i.e., psychical ones). One and the same event in both behavioural and other 
external physical phenomena can be directly perceived by multiple individuals and can 
therefore be studied with extroquestive methods and thus scientifically quantified.  
For the same reason, behavioural and external physical events can also be directly 
related to one another to explore which particular external events independent of individuals’ 
bodies functionally mediate particular behavioural events (e.g., using ethological and 
behaviour scientific methods, cf. Preuschoft 1992; Preuschoft & van Hooff 1995). Some 
methods are also used for exploring potentially associated psychical events in nonhuman 
animals (Hinde 1982) and young children (Wright & Zakriski 2003), which, however, requires 
careful consideration of potential anthropo-, ethno- and ego-centric biases on the parts of the 
researchers. 
Behavioural situations, as they functionally mediate individuals’ behaviours, are 
always also psychically relevant to individuals. But conversely, not every situation is also 
behaviourally relevant to individuals. In purely psychically relevant situations (e.g., reading), 
the individual perceives external physical events (e.g., text) and interacts with them only 
internally on the basis of his or her internal physical properties (e.g., sense organs) and 
psychical properties (e.g., perception and conception), thus without necessarily having to 
interact with them externally (i.e., behaviourally) as well (e.g., saccadic eye movements, 
turning a page). Differentiating behavioural situations from other kinds of situations allows 
researchers to scrutinise the ways in which individuals connect with external physical events 
that are independent from their bodies (i.e., how they bridge the one-sided gap of the 
psyche–external surrounding connection) while considering that isomorphisms between 
psychical and behavioural phenomena can be only low and straightforward inferences from 
behavioural events to psychical events cannot be made (cf. Toomela 2011; Uher 2013). The 
concept of “psychological situations” (Rotter 1954, 1981; Shoda, Mischel & Wright 1994), by 
contrast, denotes physical properties in the individuals’ external surrounding that are 
psychically relevant to the individuals yet without differentiating the particular involvement of 
their behaviour (often due to insufficient differentiation of psychical from behavioural 
phenomena).  
The particular physical events in the external surroundings that constitute a situation 
for an individual in a given moment can but need not be bound to the present moment. They 
become part of the situation only while they are mediating the individual’s behaviour or while 
the individual can perceive them. Before and thereafter, they conceptually belong to the 
universe of physical events in the external surroundings. Events in the individuals’ wider 
contextual layers of that universe (e.g., socio-economic, sociocultural or societal systems; cf. 
Bronfenbrenner 1979) can affect individuals only indirectly as mediated through physical 
events that are present in a given situation so that the individuals can directly perceive them 
(e.g., public media, goods in the shops, teacher and books at school). Once the individual 
has psychically represented the meanings of such events, they can also further affect the 
                                               
17
 Previously called the “environmental situation” (Uher 2011a, 2011b, 2013; Uher et al. 2013b). 
18
 This particular constellation may not always be (a priori) explicitly known. 
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individual (again, only indirectly) when the individual reconstructs the pertinent psychical 
representations in a given moment. These psychical representations, in and of themselves, 
can affect the individual directly in the moments in which they are reconstructed.  
As psychically relevant situations inherently involve the construction of meaning on 
the part of the individual under study, their exploration requires not only extroquestive 
methods and scientific quantifications of the physical phenomena involved but also 
introquestive and hermeneutic-interpretive methods to explore the studied individuals’ 
physical phenomena (e.g., perceptions, constructed meanings). Thus, a plurality of 
methodologies is required that are selectively and complementarily applied to explore each 
of the different kinds of phenomena that are comprised by the complex composite 
phenomena of contexts (see also Uher 2014c in this trilogy). 
Culture: Systems of semiotic representations commonly conceived of as 
“environments”   
Culture is commonly conceived of dualistically as “environment” in terms of 
contextual phenomena that are external to and independent from the individuals studied. But 
in the broadest sense, culture denotes semiotically mediated systems of socially shared 
meanings (Geertz 1973; Weber 1904)—thus, complex systems of semiotic representations. 
The TPS-Paradigm therefore conceives of cultures as composite kinds of phenomena 
comprising psychical representations of co-constructed meanings that are tightly intertwined 
with external phenomena in which these meanings are physically represented in 
socioculturally shared ways and that thereby become behavioural signs (e.g., phonemes, 
behavioural practices) and material signs (e.g., graphems, monuments). The events of both 
the psychical phenomena and the physical phenomena comprised by cultural phenomena 
may vary in their temporal extension; some events may be momentary and others not. It 
follows that, for cultural phenomena, heterogeneous metatheoretical properties can be 
conceived, resulting in highly complex internal structures and necessarily low isomorphisms 
between interrelated events of the different kinds of phenomena that are comprised.  
Importantly, cultural representations (e.g., language)—as all semiotic 
representations—always involve psychical phenomena per definition. This means that 
cultural phenomena cannot be conceptually separated in exclusive ways from the 
individuals' psychical systems and their workings (Geertz 1973; Valsiner & Han 2008; 
Valsiner 1987, 1998, 2000). The physical phenomena comprised by cultural phenomena 
(e.g., cultural artefacts) can be separated from the individuals under study only inclusively on 
the basis of the three metatheoretical properties that the TPS-Paradigm considers, such as 
for exploring the particular meanings that individuals construct for and assign to particular 
physical phenomena. Exploring cultural phenomena therefore requires selective 
combinations of a plurality of complementary methodologies as described for semiotic 
representations (cf. Fahrenberg 2013; Wundt 1894, 1920, 1921).  
IV) “Personality” as explored in the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science 
Paradigm for Research on Individuals 
Based on the above-described metatheoretical and methodological foundations for 
research on individuals in general (part III), the TPS-Paradigm elaborates philosophy-of-
science foundations for exploring individuals’ “personality”. The following (part IV) first 
metatheoretically defines “personality” that the TPS-Paradigm conceives of as individual-
specificity and then derives specific implications for exploring individual-specificity in each 
given kind of phenomenon explored in individuals (cf. Uher 2013, Desideratum 1a). 
Applications and implementations of these methodologies are elaborated and discussed 
through the example of taxonomic “personality” research in Uher (2014b and c) in this 
trilogy. 
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“Personality” conceived of as individual-specificity in all kinds of phenomena 
explored in individuals: Metatheoretical definitions  
Definitions of “personality” vary greatly (cf. Allport 1937). Most established definitions 
refer to only some of the various kinds of phenomena differentiated in the TPS-Paradigm (for 
details, see Uher 2013). Decisions about which kinds of phenomena to consider—and which 
ones to discard—can be made only on the basis of absolute presuppositions. The TPS-
Paradigm, in line with its transdisciplinary agenda, makes no particular presuppositions in 
this regard and therefore considers all of the various kinds of phenomena explored in 
individuals. The aim is to develop coherent and comprehensive metatheoretical and 
methodological frameworks that researchers can use to explore their particular kinds of 
phenomena of interest and that are helpful for establishing links between lines of research 
exploring different kinds of phenomena cf. Uher 2013, Desiderata 3, 6, 7). 
In the occurrences of events in the various kinds of phenomena explored in 
individuals, which particular patterns are actually conceived of as “personality”? After all, not 
every occurrence of, for example, behavioural or psychical events in an individual is 
commonly referred to as “personality”—neither in everyday life nor in research. The notions 
of “a person’s consistent patterns”, “individual characteristics” and “individual uniqueness” 
that are commonly used in psychological definitions of “personality” are surprisingly vague 
for scientific definitions. Importantly, they fail to specify what is meant to be “consistent” with 
what and which patterns are considered “different”, “unique” and “characteristic” and why. 
These notions also fail to differentiate from one another between-individual and within-
individual variations and to consider complexity in both compositional structures and 
processes structures (as explored in detail in Uher 2014c in this trilogy). This is remarkable 
given that central kinds of the phenomena explored in individuals are heterogeneous, 
complex, momentary, dynamic and highly fluctuating. In such phenomena, patterns that are 
characteristic of a given individual cannot be directly recognised (Uher 2013). 
The TPS-Paradigm conceives of “personality” as patterns in the occurrences of 
events that are specific to an individual—thus individual-specific. Patterns can be individual-
specific only if they differ between individuals (i.e., are differential) in ways that are stable for 
at least some amount of time (i.e., are temporally stable; Uher 2011a, 2013). These 
concepts, together with the metatheoretical and methodological foundations of phenomenon-
methodology matching and scientific quantification, allow researchers to explore individual-
specificity in individuals’ averages, for example, across time periods (e.g., individual-
specificity in within-individual temporal stability of behavioural patterns), across various kinds 
of situations (e.g., individual-specific situation-behaviour profiles) and across various kinds of 
behaviours (e.g., individual-specific behaviour profiles; for some empirical demonstrations, 
see Uher et al., 2013b). In addition, these concepts enable explorations of individual-
specificity in the variabilities and ranges in the occurrences of events of momentary and 
fluctuating phenomena, such as across specified time periods (e.g., individual-specificity in 
circadian or day-to-day fluctuations in physiological patterns). These analytical concepts are 
required to comprehensively explore individual-specific compositional structures and process 
structures of “personality” functioning and development (as elaborated in 2014c in this 
trilogy). The following outlines special methodological implications for the primary 
identification of individual-specificity in each given kind of phenomenon studied in individuals 
(cf. Uher 2013, Desideratum 1a).  
Special methodological implications for identifying individual-specificity in each given 
kind of phenomenon 
To identify individual-specificity, researchers must carefully consider the particular 
forms that can be conceived with regard to the three metatheoretical properties for each 
given kind of phenomenon. As their particular constellation constitutes the frame of 
reference of each given phenomenon, these properties unequivocally determine the 
methodologies that are appropriate to enable its exploration. Specifically, if complete 
metatheoretical commensurability cannot be conceived, researchers must define encoding 
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schemes that establish at least consent-based commensurability with the frame of reference 
of the particular phenomenon under study. 
In individuals’ outer morphology (e.g., physiognomy), temporally stable differential 
patterns can be identified rather directly because these phenomena are external, material 
physical and temporally more extended, thus enabling extroquestive methods and scientific 
quantifications. Under particular conditions (e.g., when individuals are next to each other), 
events can be simultaneously perceived in different individuals and be directly compared 
between them enabling the straightforward identification of differential patterns (e.g., body 
size, hair colour). If the morphological phenomena are known to be temporally extended, 
these differential patterns can be assumed to reflect individual-specific patterns.  
In individuals’ internal morphology (e.g., bones, ligaments) and in the phenomena of 
physiology (e.g., of the immune system), individual-specificity often cannot be directly 
perceived because these phenomena are internal and because of the micro-level extension 
of many of these phenomena (e.g., physiological phenomena). Identification of individual-
specificity therefore requires the measurement of events in each individual (mostly obtained 
invasively and technically and in fluctuating phenomena also repeatedly) the post-hoc 
comparison of these individual patterns (i.e., after obtaining them) between individuals and 
over time.  
In behaviours (e.g., social contact behaviours), individual-specific patterns cannot be 
directly perceived because behavioural phenomena are momentary and fluctuate and 
behavioural events vary in their spatial and temporal extension (Uher 2013). Individual 
patterns can be quantified only by the time-relative probabilities by which defined kinds of 
behavioural events occur and which inherently requires the accumulation of events 
registered repeatedly over time. The scientifically quantified measurements thus-obtained 
are compared after their collection (i.e., post-hoc) between individuals to identify differential 
patterns. To reflect patterns that are specific to individuals, differential patterns in time-
relative behavioural probabilities must be stable across time periods longer than those in 
which the probabilities were first ascertained and in ways that are considered to be 
meaningful. Such meaning may be defined, for example by the strength of statistical 
correlations over specified time periods (for details, see Uher 2013; Uher et al. 2013b). This 
means that temporal patterns are to be explored in patterns that are in and of themselves 
defined by a certain temporal stability. 
In experiencings (e.g., particular kinds of emotions, thoughts, motivations) and 
memorised psychical resultants (e.g., psychical representations, knowledge acquired, self-
concepts) individual patterns cannot be directly perceived because psychical phenomena 
are fundamentally imperceptible by other individuals. This also precludes direct comparisons 
between individuals to identify differential patterns. Explorations inherently require 
introquestive methods and must rely on individuals’ externalisations. Researchers must 
carefully consider that the physical phenomena used by the studied individuals for 
externalisations (i.e., behaviours, behavioural and material signs) have different frames of 
reference and therefore cannot be completely metatheoretically commensurable with the 
psychical phenomena to be explored. As experiencings are strictly momentary, and 
memorised psychical resultants (both the contents and the processing of these contents) 
can be activated only in experiencings, repeated nunc-ipsum or retro-introquestive methods 
are required for recording individuals’ externalisations. These externalisations, as they are 
physical, can be explored using extroquestive methods and can be scientifically quantified 
through the accumulation of events across time to obtain individual patterns (e.g., using the 
concept of time-relative probabilities). The individual patterns thus-obtained are then 
compared post-hoc between individuals and over time to identify individual-specific patterns 
in the externalisations made. These findings are then explored using hermeneutic-
interpretive methodologies and, ideally, by involving the individuals studied to some extent in 
order to reconstruct possible individual-specific patterns in the psychical phenomena that 
may be related to the externalisations explored and in the ways in which they are 
externalised by individuals.  
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Explorations of individual-specificity in psychical process structures provide some 
examples, such as intelligence and achievement tests, “performance-tests of personality” 
(Cronbach 1970) and some “objective personality tests sensu Cattell” (Cattell & Warburton 
1967; Kubinger 2009). In these methods, outcomes of psychical processes that are 
executed in the individuals’ ongoing experiencings (e.g., mathematical operations) are 
registered immediately after their generation and repeatedly across multiple occasions, and 
the accumulated outcomes are then set in relation to the physical time in which they were 
generated (e.g., IQ scores. Individuals’ performances are then compared post-hoc between 
individuals and across time to identify individual-specific patterns (e.g., norm-referencing of 
IQ scores). Importantly, direct quantitative inferences on the psychical phenomena in and of 
themselves cannot be made given their particular metatheoretical properties; this point is 
frequently overlooked in the interpretation of results (see Uher 2014c in this trilogy). 
In semiotic representations, individual-specificity cannot be directly perceived 
because physical signs cannot be interpreted without the meanings to which they are 
assigned. Individuals’ use of signs (e.g., gestures, words) can be explored for stable 
differential patterns in the probabilities of the (co-)occurrences of particular signs that are 
scientifically quantified by relating them to the physical time in which they were used or to 
defined sets of signs, such as total number of words (cf. Schonhardt-Bailey, Yager & Lahlou 
2012). This requires extroquestive methods and enables scientific quantifications. Individual-
specific patterns in the use of signs can, but need not reflect individual-specificity in the fields 
of meanings that individuals construct for particular signs (e.g., words, questionnaire items) 
and for particular events and phenomena that are being semiotically represented (e.g., 
individual-specific behaviours). Identification of individual-specificity in meaning construction 
and in psychical representations (e.g., about individual-specificity in particular phenomena) 
and in the externalisations used requires introquestive and hermeneutic-interpretive methods 
(examples are discussed in Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
In artificially modified outer appearance, individual patterns can be identified more 
directly than in behaviours because the external material phenomena of outer appearances 
are temporally more extended (e.g., hairstyle, clothing). As many people modify their outer 
appearance from day to day, in contrast to natural outer morphology, individual patterns are 
scientifically quantified on the basis of records obtained using extroquestive approaches and 
on different days, accumulated over time and set in relation to the time periods in which they 
were obtained. The time-relative probabilities thus-obtained are compared post-hoc between 
individuals and over time to identify individual-specificity in the physical phenomena that are 
comprised by the phenomena of artificially modified outer appearance. To identify individual-
specificity in the particular meanings that are attributed to these individual-specific physical 
appearances—by the individual him- or herself and by other individuals—introquestive and 
hermeneutic-interpretive methods must be applied. 
In the phenomena of contexts, individual-specific patterns are not directly perceivable 
given the diverse kinds of phenomena that may be comprised. Their identification requires a 
plurality of methodologies that are each targeted toward the particular kind of phenomenon 
for which they are appropriate. For exploring individual-specificity, it must be considered that 
particular internal and external physical events have, in different constellations, different 
relevance for different individuals—for their behaviours in different ways than for their 
psychical systems. Hence, although in external physical material phenomena, individual 
patterns can be identified rather directly and compared post-hoc between individuals and 
over time, exploration of the meanings and relevance that they have for particular individuals 
requires introquestive and hermeneutic-interpretive methods to identify individual-specificity 
(examples are explored in Uher 2014b in this trilogy).  
Summary 
This article presented central foundations of the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-
Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm). It started (part I) by 
highlighting that, because researchers themselves are always individuals, researchers 
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studying individuals encounter intricate challenges, in particular, high risks for anthropo-, 
ethno- and ego-centric biases and various fallacies of the human mind that influence the 
metatheories and methodologies that researchers develop. These peculiarities also entail 
the fact that, in research on individuals, “objectivity” can be only “intersubjectivity”, which 
must be achieved on the basis of shared philosophical presuppositions.  
The article (part II) outlined the nature and aims of the TPS-Paradigm and specified 
central absolute presuppositions that this paradigm makes about individuals. Basic 
epistemological concepts for exploring individuals were introduced such as the Bohrian 
principle of complementarity and concepts that consider the peculiarities that arise from the 
fact that individuals are living organisms (e.g., principle of emergence, multi-contextuality, 
causal and compositional connections, dialectical processes, self-organisation). The article 
introduced the paradigm’s elementary system of the three metatheoretical properties that 
can be conceived for the various kinds of phenomena explored in individuals (i.e., spatial 
location in relation to the individual’s material entity, temporal extension and physicality 
versus “non-physicality”). This elementary system also enables metatheoretical 
differentiations of these phenomena into the four basic kinds of the phenomena of 
morphology, physiology, behaviour and the psyche, and the three composite kinds of the 
phenomena of semiotic representations, artificially modified outer appearance and contexts.  
From the philosophical presuppositions made about research on individuals, general 
epistemological principles were derived (i.e., methodological pluralism). The elementary 
system of the three metatheoretical properties was used to derive general methodological 
implications for the exploration of the various kinds of phenomena (i.e., nunc-ipsum 
methods, extroquestive and introquestive methods). Building on this, the article elaborated 
philosophy-of-science foundations of phenomenon-methodology matching (e.g., 
metatheoretical and consent-based commensurability, basic conversion principles) and of 
scientific quantification (e.g., set-theoretic and algebraic requirements, concept of time-
relative probabilities). These elaborations provide clear-cut criteria that researchers can use 
to decide whether or not particular methodologies match a given phenomenon to be studied 
and whether or not particular phenomena can be scientifically quantified by using what 
particular methodology.  
Thereafter (part III), these philosophy-of-science foundations were applied to define 
and to explore in more detail each of the various kinds of phenomena that the TPS-
Paradigm differentiates. The article derived implications for the particular metatheories and 
methodologies that are required for exploring each given kind of phenomenon in individuals 
in general. Finally (part IV), the article introduced some philosophy-of-science foundations 
that the TPS-Paradigm provides for research on “personality”, which it conceives of as 
individual-specificity in all rather than just some of the various kinds of phenomena explored 
in individuals. Specific methodological implications were derived for the identification of 
individual-specificity in each given kind of phenomenon considering their particular 
constellations of metatheoretical properties. 
The two following articles in this trilogy apply the fundamentals of the TPS-Paradigm 
outlined in this article to explore the basic metatheories and methodologies that are used in 
research on individuals using the example of taxonomic “personality" research. The second 
article (Uher 2014b) focuses on the three methodological steps that are required to develop 
comprehensive taxonomic models of individual-specificity, illustrated by analysing some 
currently popular models as examples. The third article (Uher 2014c) explores the theoretical 
interpretations of the thus-obtained taxonomic models, constructs and data regarding the 
phenomena that these represent and elaborates on the different kinds of taxonomies that 
are required to comprehensively explore the process structures of individual functioning and 
development. In both articles, the presented analyses reveal frequent mismatches between 
the metatheories and the methodologies that are applied in the field. The articles show that 
these mismatches derive from a lack of explicit formulation and from insufficient critical 
reflection on the philosophical and metatheoretical assumptions that are being made by 
researchers as well as from widespread erroneous assumptions about the abilities of 
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particular methodologies to appropriately represent the targeted phenomena and the 
individual-specific variations in them.  
The insights gained from this trilogy of articles highlight that transdisciplinary and 
philosophy-of-science perspectives are essential to help researchers overcome obstacles 
that hinder progress in the field and to open up novel avenues for future research. 
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